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ABSTRACT
This thesis will examine the role of Jiang Qing in the events o f China known as the 
Cultural Revolution, and show that this revolution was affected in its political as well as its 
cultural aspects by her influence. Historians have not carefully examined Jiang Qing's role 
in China's history, and have commonly regarded her simply as "Mao's wife." The theme 
that will be developed in this thesis is that she was of major importance in China during 
the years 1966-1976, the period of the Cultural Revolution. Materials from a variety of 
sources are analyzed and synthesized to support this position.
m
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PROLOGUE
Stories of powerfril women rulers hold an especially fascinating place in the minds 
of both westerners and orientals, and China has produced its share of illustrious female 
leaders. These include Wu Zetian of the Tang Dynasty, Empress Lu of the Han Dynasty, 
and Ci X , the infamous "dragon lady" o f the Qing Dynasty. This thesis is an account of 
one other such person, Jiang Qing, who was the wife o f Chinese Communist Party 
Chairman Mao Zedong from the late 1930s until his death in 1976.
Jiang Qing (JQ) has been the subject of two important biographies in English, and 
non-controversial information about JQ that is included here usually comes from one or 
both of these sources. The earlier of these. Comrade Chiang Ch'ing, by the American 
historian Roxane Witke, was based on interviews granted to l^tke by JQ in 1972, and 
was published in 1977. ̂  This book was the basis for a cover article in Time magazine, 
March 21, 1977, and gave the American public its first detailed account o f JQ's life. JQ 
controlled the material that was included in this book, and while it is valuable as a starting 
point in assessing JQ and for a view of life inside China that was not generally available at 
the time of writing, it is an incomplete and inaccurate account of JQ and her importance.
Ross Terrill, an Australian with a journalistic background, and who was at one 
time a research associate at Harvard's East Asia Research Center, presented a more critical 
and insightful biography of JQ in 1992. In Madame Mao : The White-Boned Demon, 
Terrill traced details of JQ's life that had not been disclosed to Whke.^ What emerged 
from Terrill's book was a picture of JQ that was less than flattering, and a picture in which
vii
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she was perhaps deserving o f the cruel characterization of the book's subtitle. Still, 
Terrill's account lacked an appreciation of the role played by JQ in the politics o f China 
during the Cultural Revolution (CR), and continued a tradition that regarded JQ as 
important only for her cultural contributions.
Several books were o f special value in writing this thesis. Professor An Tai Sung, 
although educated in America, provided an Oriental (Korean) perspective on events of the 
CR. Written in 1972, his book Mao Tse-tung*s Cultural Revolution was an early scholarly 
work that supplied good explanations for many o f the basic "ingredients" of the CR. It 
lacked, however, an appreciation of the revolution's cultural significance.^ Books by 
foreign journalists often had insights into the Chinese people that could not be obtained 
fi'om the suspect documents o f the Chinese government, or the people themselves.
Stanley Kamow’s Mao and China, originally published in 1972, was such a book. A 3rd 
edition (in 1990) allowed Kamow to include an account of the later years of the CR. Ms 
detailed and well documented history presented more than a superficial analysis o f events, 
and often broke through the bewildering maze of facts with a plausible explanation as to 
why those events took place.'* Fox Butterfield, another American journalist, lived in 
Beijing in 1981 and gathered material for his report China: Alive in the Bitter Sea. He 
presented a view of life in China after Mao, and found that Chinese were still hesitant to 
speak finnkly about their experiences during the CR, for fear of political reprisals.^
Clare HoUingworth, a former British war correspondent, while writing about Mao 
(Mao and the Men Against Mm), became preoccupied with JQ.^ Her study of China in 
the years 1974-76 revolved more around JQ that it did Mao. Written firom a feminine 
perspective, HoUingworth furnished insights into JQ that were not found in other sources. 
A recent book by Mao's physician, Li Zhisui (The Private Life of Chairman Mao. 1994), 
likewise exhibited an inordinate interest in JQ.^
viii
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Bonnie S. McDougall compiled a valuable collection of twelve scholarly articles on 
the arts in the People's Republic of China (PRC).* Several of these articles are relevant to 
this thesis, and they are referred to frequently. Books by K. H. Fan, ed.. The Chinese 
Cultural Revolution: Selected Documents; the Asia Research Centre, The Great Cultural 
Revolution in China; and James T. Myers, Jurgen Domes, and Erik von Groeling, eds., 
Chinese Politics: Documents and Analysis are compilations in English translation of 
government documents originally written in Chinese.^ Historical background material has 
been obtained from Craig Dietrich, People's China, John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. 
Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, and Jonathan 
D. Spence, The Search for Modem China.
The pinyin method of romanization of Chinese characters will usually be used here. 
When citing material written prior to the adoption of this method in the early 1980s, the 
spellings of the original sources will be retained, as it is under those spellings that those 
materials are referenced and catalogued in English language libraries. The most common 
occurrences of these spellings are "Chiang Ch'ing" (for Jiang Qing), "Mao Tse-tung" (Mao 
Zedong), and "Peking" (Beijing).
IX
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CHAPTER 1
A STAR IS BORN 
Setting the Stage
The fourth wife of Mao Zedong was bom Li Chin in Shandong province, 1914. * 
She was also known as Li Yunhe and Shu-meng. As a stage and film actress in Shanghai 
in the 1930s, she adopted the name Lan Ping (Blue Apple). When she became Mao's wife, 
she took the name Jiang Qing (Green River). In the Westem world she was known simply 
as Madame Mao.
At the time of her birth, her father was over 60 years old, and her mother over 40; 
her brothers and sisters were all much older. Her mother left her abusive husband to work 
in different positions as a domestic servant, taking her young daughter with her, and these 
early formative years were a period of instability for JQ. There is some indication that 
JQ's mother may have worked in the household of Kang Sheng, who became a key figure 
in the PRC, and JQ may have met Kang at this time.^ At age seven, she was sent to the 
household o f her grandparents, and after a short period of schooling, began to appear in 
theatrical productions. Some reports indicated that she was kidnapped and forced into 
this life by white slavers.^ This unstable environment of her youth may explain her 
readiness to abandon conventional life stries and her later attacks on the importance of the 
family in traditional Chinese culture.
1
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In 1930, JQ had a marriage of a few months duration to a merchant, a Mr. Fei, in 
the city of Jinan.'* In 1931, she began living in the city of Qingdao with Yu Qiwei, a 
communist underground leader, and at that time showed an early interest in communist 
ideology. Accounts of these years of JQ presented her as a woman of distinctive and 
strong personality. She was described as a woman who was pretty, vivacious, perky and 
spontaneous; cocky, bold, aggressive, pushy, arrogant, unpredictable and difficult to 
please. She was also petty, spiteful, outspoken and abrasive; head-strong, self-willed, 
vengeful and vindictive. Her manner was perceived as being theatrical and dramatic. She 
was regarded as a woman of great courage and perseverance; fearless and independent, 
opportunistic and ambitious, but shrewd, scheming, domineering and calculating. Clearly, 
she projected different images of her complex personality to different people. While the 
circumstances of her life were to change, her character did not.
In 1934, she moved to Shanghai, the city known as the "Pearl of the Orient," and a 
city which was perhaps the most cosmopolitan in all of China. While there, she had an 
exposure to the life of the arts and artists, the liberal thinking of radical cultural 
elements, and bohemian life styles. She was a willing participant in the avant-garde artistic 
circles of Shanghai and during this time was "notorious for her promiscuity."^ Nora, the 
rebellious and independent heroine of Ibsen's "A Doll's House" became a role model for 
the equally rebellious JQ, and she successfully played the stage role of Nora in 1935.® Her 
film and stage career in Shanghai was only moderately successful, however, and 
individuals there that she held responsible for inhibiting her career would incur her wrath 
in the later CR. It was here that she met, or re-met, Kang Sheng, who had become an 
early Communist leader.
While in Shanghai, in 1936, she had a one-year marriage, described as "stormy" (it 
involved public arguments, fights, and threats of suicide) to Tang Na, who was prominent 
in artistic and community circles in that city.^ Her Shanghai years indicated a continuing
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interest in Communist left-wing activity. Communist affiliation was at that time no small 
matter, as fears of reprisal, persecution, and even death were well founded. Communist 
activity was carried out secretly and underground. Jiang Qing was herself imprisoned in 
1934 by the Nationalist Government forces of Chang Kai-shek, the Goumindong (GMD), 
for three (or perhaps eight) months.* Suspected communist sympathizers arrested at this 
time were sometimes treated harshly, by being physically mistreated, or more leniently, by 
being asked to leave the city. In that time of political uncertainty, there were no standard 
legal procedures to be followed in cases of political deviance, and penalties depended on 
decisions of local authorities. The date of her actual Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
membership is given as diversely as 1933 and 1940, with 1933 being the most widely 
accepted year.^
JQ, as well as other dedicated Communists, did not separate political activity from 
other aspects of life. Witke reported one striking example of this. While attending a 
theater performance in 1936, JQ expressed outrage at an actress for playing the role of 
mistress to a German general. This was not, in her opinion, a role suitable for a Chinese. 
Other members of the theatrical troupe became so agitated at JQ's conduct that they 
actually threatened her life. It would be unusual in any culture for a member of an 
audience to go backstage after a theatrical performance to berate a performer for "political 
errors," much less to such an extent that the situation became life threatening. This 
incident illustrated the passionate reactions that her personality was able to arouse. Her 
attitude was similar to that of a single-minded religious zealot, seeing all of life, in her 
case, as being painted with a political brush.
The Japanese invaded Shanghai in 1937. At this time, JQ traveled to Yanan, 
where Mao Zedong had set up CCP headquarters at the conclusion of the famous Long 
March. Mao was conducting public lectures at Yanan; JQ sat in front rows at these 
appearances, and responded enthusiastically to his speeches. It was apparent that she and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Mao did not meet by chance, but by JQ's design. Mao was certainly a willing participant 
in their union, having been "captivated" by the "vivacious and attractive actress."**
The prospect of the marriage of JQ and Mao was not readily endorsed by other 
party officials. "In the regimented community of Yanan, marriage was not a personal 
afiair," and some Communist leaders there actually suspected JQ of being a GMD spy.*^ 
JQ's friend, Kang Sheng, attested to her Communist loyalty, and his sanction of the 
marriage was decisive. The union was eventually approved by the Party leadership, but 
with the understanding that JQ not involve herself in political affairs for, by some reports, 
a period of twenty years. *̂  This was an extraordinary stipulation on the terms of a 
marriage, and could not have been motivated by mere suspicion of JQ's possible GMD 
ties. There is no record as to which individuals opposed the marriage, but they must have 
included some of Zhou Enlai, Deng Xaoping, Lin Biao, and Liu Shaoqi, all of whom were 
present at Yanan and were to remain in leadership roles in China after the founding of the 
PRC. There was a suggestion in this incident that objectors to the marriage foresaw and 
were fearful o f JQ's political ambitions, and this may have been an early attempt on the 
part of the Communist Party hierarchy to prevent those ambitions from being realized.
However, there is a more innocent interpretation of this restriction. The acting 
profession was held in low esteem by many Chinese, and these men, foreseeing Mao's 
eventual leadership of the Communist Party, may not have wished for the country to be 
"tainted" by having a former actress as First Lady. In support of this view, the New York 
Times speculated that she was "kept down" for twenty years because of (potential) "moral 
and political embarassment."*^ In any event, the marriage took place in 1938.*  ̂ If in fact 
JQ observed a twenty-year exclusion from political activity as a condition of this marriage, 
this may account for her absence from the political scene until the 1960s.
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Rehearsal for Revolution
During the early 1940s, JQ was acting as Mao's secretarial assistant. Witke 
referred to JQ at Yanan as a "mute observer." Given the self-serving purpose of the Wtke 
interviews, it is plausible that had JQ furnished Mao with political ideas of her own at that 
time, she would have mentioned this.*® Yet, JQ may have had some influence on Mao. 
HoUingworth stated that Mao's interest in culture was prompted by JQ.*^ Whether 
prompted by JQ or not, Mao's interest in culture led to an event important for China's 
cultural future.
In 1942, Mao presented an essay entitled "TaUcs at the Yanan Forum on Literature 
and the Arts." This was an unusual topic for a military leader, and especiaUy for one who 
was facing far more pressing issues at that time. China was at war with Japan, the 
Communists forces were stiU in conflict with the Nationalist government headed by 
Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao was solidifying his own leadership of the communist 
movement. Yet Mao was a supreme theoretician, and, realizing the role that art could 
play in govermnent, he developed in this essay a political foundation and rationale for 
artistic work. He spoke of bourgeois and imperialist themes "which we call traitor 
literature and art," and emphasized that "With us, literature and art are for the people. . .  
There is in fact no such thing as art for art's sake, art that stands above classes or art that 
is detached fliim or independent of politics." Mao recaUed the Leninist theme that 
literature and art were "cogs and wheels" in the revolutionary machine, and even his 
choice of words regarding art criticism was prophetic of events in the future CR;
"Literary and art criticism is one of the principal methods of struggle in the world of 
literature and art."**
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Mao soon implemented a practical application of this theory of the arts in Yanan. 
Citing a Chinese tradition, "The use and adaptation by Chinese rulers of songs and dances 
among the people, both for court ceremony and for public instruction, has a long history in 
China," Mao politicized "yangge," which was a form of combination folk dance, music and 
variety act. Traditional roles in this art form were replaced by groups of workers, 
peasants, soldiers, and students. "Negative" characters were banished, and new words and 
plots were introduced to emphasize patriotic themes.*^
Within the Chinese tradition, involvement in the realm of the arts by a political 
leader was no small matter. "The Party's decision to mount large scale yowgge amounted 
to a claim on the Mandate of Heaven." David Holm suggested that yangge was not 
emphasized in the CR because JQ disliked folksongs and preferred the more refined 
cultural medium of Beijing Opera. Mao, well read in Chinese history, realized that a 
legitimate government of the Chinese people would include a policy involving their 
cultural lives. Perhaps anticipating his future victory over the GMD, he sought to 
establish an early Communist position on the arts. Yangge was an important aspect of the 
lives of the people, and even at Yanan there was an attempt by Mao to use art for the 
political purposes of affecting the lives of the "masses."
Of such importance was Mao’s pronouncement at the Yanan Forum that "The year 
1942 is widely regarded, both in China and by scholars in the west, as a watershed in the 
history of modem Chinese literature and the arts."^* Terrill reported that "Years later, she 
[JQ] said that she had influenced the Talks” but he provided no documentation for this 
claim. Witke did not record JQ as having had any part in that talk.
In those Yanan days, Mao advocated the theme that history was made by "the 
people," or the masses. Chinese theatrical productions traditionally presented a series of 
kings, princes, lords and ladies as main characters, and so gave a distorted version of 
"reality." Mao's government intruded into the arts, to bring them into conformity with
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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political reality. This idea evolved into a two-pronged assault on culture that was to find 
expression in the later CR: criticism (i.e., rejection, by government dictate) of old artistic 
models, and promotion (by governmental decree) o f new, approved aesthetic ideals. JQ 
would recall Mao's words at this Forum many times during the CR.
The CCP arose in part as an alternative to the corruption and cruelty of the GMD 
leadership, and diminished roles of local warlords. These three conflicting groups had 
formed loose alliances to combat the threat of Japanese invasion in the late 1930s. After 
WWn, Mao and the Communist Party emerged victorious over the GMD, the warlords 
lost much of their influence, and China was "liberated" to Communism in 1949. Mao 
based his new government on many ideas formulated in Yanan. And JQ was to remain 
resentfiil of the feet that she was the only wife of a prominent Party leader who was not 
"on stage" at Tiananmen Square on October 1,1949, at the official birth of the PRC.
The 1950s were a period of general poor health for JQ, for which she was often in 
Moscow for medical treatment. Still, this decade was a period when she began to express 
her own developing views on the relation between culture and politics. She initiated a 
crusade against Mei Lanfang, "the greatest Beijing opera actor of his day," whom she 
regarded as being "too attached to the old." She criticized one popular movie, "Inside 
Story of the Qing Dynasty," because it accepted the existence of a foreign presence in 
China in 1900, was critical o f the patriotic Boxers, and had been made in "decadent Hong 
Kong." She attacked another movie, "The Story of Wu Xun," which had portrayed Wu's 
life as a success story. Wu Xun bad been a beggar, who rose to a position of economic 
prominence and philanthropy. Not content with portraying the movie as evil, and against 
Mao's objections, JQ continued with an attack against the man himself as a way of making 
it known that Wu's motivation (achievement of good through economic gain) was not 
acceptable in the new governmental scheme of things.^^ This was an early instance when 
JQ would speak for herself not Mao, when it suited her purpose.
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Bonnie McDougall expressed the opinion that the 19S0s were a decade of artistic 
decline-in China as well. "There was hardly a single work of written literature in the 1950s 
and early 1960s that made a genuine claim to literary distinction," she wrote. "The 
performing arts fared slightly better, though in general the same perceptions could apply." 
She characterized the changing period in arts from the 1950s into the 1960s and 1970s as 
involving "the attempted transformation, consciously implemented by the new state, of an 
explicit, author-centered culture . . .  into a mass, audience-centered culture."^'* This 
meant in effect that artistic expression would be diverted to propaganda purposes. 
Confirming this re-direction of the arts, Robert Hegel noted that "fiction by People’s 
Liberation Army writers came to prominence just before the CR."^^
JQ received a few political appointments in the early 1950s, which included 
memberships on a Film Guidance Committee and in a China-Russia Friendship 
Association. As a member of the Guidance Committee of the Ministry of Culture, she had 
a reputation for interference. Edward Rice, American Foreign Service Officer and Consul 
General in Hong Kong for 1964 to 1967, quoted Lu Dingyi, a Deputy Director of 
Propaganda, as saying "When Comrade JQ is present, work becomes difficult."^® A 
report by Mao's personal physician confirmed this view of her irascibility: while working 
on this Committee, she "behaved so arrogantly, claiming to speak for Chairman Mao, that 
no one could get along with her."^^ Arrogance was to characterize her entire political life. 
A more significant appointment came in the winter of 1951-52, when she was named head 
of the secretariat of the General Office of the Party's Central Committee, which gave her 
access to secret papers involving the governance of China.^* She was removed from aU of 
these positions, for unclear reasons, but perhaps due to pressure from unknown party 
leaders who, wishing to be rid of her presence, recalled the terms of her marriage 
agreement with Mao. She soon exerted her influence, however, in ways in which she 
would no longer be dictated to, but would become the dictator.
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Chinese theater, as was true of so many aspects of Chinese life, was noted for its 
complexity. "Perhaps the single most striking feature of the Chinese theatrical tradition is 
its variety . "Beijing opera. . .  has been the nationally dominant form of theater in 
China for at least one hundred years. However, it is only one among more than 360 
indigenous, or traditional, forms of Chinese theater currently being staged, " wrote 
Elizabeth Wichmann in 1983. Nor were these many forms simple variants of one another; 
"Each of the more than 360 forms of traditional theater is well defined, having its own 
characteristics, musical style and method of stylization.”̂ ** Theatrical performances in 
China usually contained music, and were referred to as "operas," rather than plays. It was 
the Beijing Opera form of theater that JQ adopted for political usage, and these operas 
were a key component in the CR that was to follow. The evidence suggested that these 
ideas came from JQ.
After her health improved in the early 1960s, JQ held other minor governmental 
positions that involved censorship and control o f the arts, especially films. Whenever 
films placed capitalism or China's upper classes in a favorable light, or extolled individual 
enterprise, she found them objectionable. She authored an article in the Summer of 1961, 
"The Good Traditions of a Certain Company of the Red Army," which contained little 
substantial content, but which commended the company for their role in guarding Mao and 
Lin Biao.^* It is significant that JQ's interests at this time were not confined to cultural 
matters. In the early 1960s, she made "an enormous effort. . .  to read basic Communist 
literature and to educate herself in Marxism." These efforts were successful to the extent 
that by the summer of 1965, she was "invaluable to the Chairman both as a reporter on 
what people were thinking and saying and as a political advisor” (my emphasis).^^
While practical aspects o f communism were being implemented in rural areas via 
communes and state control of land, what Marx called the "superstructure" of society — 
education, literature, and the arts — was being neglected. In Communist doctrine, this
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superstructure required the centrality of the state, its leaders, and their ideology.^^ Mao 
perceived a need to revise the superstructure to provide support for the base, and he could 
do this with a plan that would solve his political problems as well.
Mao's political problems were increasing during the early 1960s. These problems 
included social inequities and an entrenched power of new bureaucratic elites. '̂* This 
involved what Mao viewed as corruption within upper levels of party management. In 
feet, the misuse of power by party cadres had begun almost as soon as the PRC was 
established. A "three-anti" campaign of 1951 bad targeted corruption, waste, and 
excessive bureaucracy in the CCP, and a similar "five-anti" program began in 1952. 
Although capitalists no longer "officially" existed in China, some cadres were perceived as 
exhibiting such capitalistic traits as the pursuit of material comforts and personal well­
being. These bureaucrats exhibited a declining interest in Mao's theory of communism as 
a continuing class struggle. Mao viewed the dachaus and limousines of Party leaders in 
the USSR as symptoms of a "reactionary" direction Soviet Conununism had taken, and 
Chinese-Soviet relations had deteriorated by 1960. Among "revisionist" views that Mao 
objected to were the use of economic incentives in industrial and agricultural management, 
over-reliance on technical skills, educational conservatism, copying Westem cultural 
mores and having friendly feelings toward the USSR^^ There was no doubt that Mao 
genuinely feared that Chinese Communism could take this same "perverted" course.
Mao's discomfort over this issue was given popular expression by Yang Xquang, a 
high school student in Hunan province, who in an essay "Whither China?" referred to a 
"decadent class" of high-ranking officials, who were no longer leaders, but who had 
become "red capitalist" rulers, with high incomes.^® The lives of most Chinese revolved 
around the "work unit" to which they were assigned, and CCP cadres controlled these 
units. They had the power to regulate marriages, job transfers, places of residence and 
many facets of daily life. The system lent itself to favoritism, similar to what in the west
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would be called "having connections," and the power of these cadres was such that in 
many cases th ^  had simply replaced the old landlords in their exploitation o f workers.
Further adding to Mao's troubles were policy problems with local leaderships, 
especially those in Beijing. The "Hundred Flowers" campaign of Spring, 1956, in which 
Mao had invited public criticism of his government, produced such an unexpected 
expression of dissatisfaction, especially among intellectuals, that Mao reacted quickly to 
suppress this dissent. The ensuing "Anti-rightist" campaign, wherein hundreds of 
thousands of outspoken Chinese were sent to the countryside, produced a loss of 
confidence in his ability to lead. Economic disasters resulting fi"om the Great Leap 
Forward (1958-61) added to this loss of confidence. Liu Shaoqi, then vice chairman of 
the CCP, was advocating general policies of "social stability," and "two lines" of Chinese 
Communism, Maoism and Liuism, were emerging. Mao saw China's problems as based in 
class struggle, and Liu saw them as caused by corruption among local cadres. Mao 
regarded "communism" as a continuing process, while Liu, inclining to a Soviet view, 
believed that the principles of communism would result in a stable society. These 
theoretical differences caused wide differences in policy. Mao hoped to solve these 
problems with the Socialist Education Movement (SEM), which lasted fi*om 1962 to 
1965.
The "Early Ten Points" of May, 1963, replaced by "The Later Ten Points" in 
September, set up the SEM, which was primarily designed to benefit rural areas and 
increase agricultural output. The even later "Twenty-three Articles," of January, 1965, 
indicated a continuing struggle between Mao and his opponents, especially Liu, over the 
issues of this movement. The twenty-three points "became the crucial document that led 
to the conflict between Mao and his opponents during the CR."^^
One important point of dispute between Mao and Liu Shaoqi was over the method 
of dealing with party cadres who were found to be "mistaken" in their political thinking.
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Mao advised a tolerant, permissive attitude, which would allow wayward cadres to repent, 
as it were, of doctrinal errors, while they continued in their positions. Liu advocated a 
radical approach, whereby cadres would be dismissed. In illustration of this disagreement, 
Wang Guangmei, wife of Liu Shaoqi, headed one work party team (as part of the SEM) at 
Qinghua University in Beijing, where she dismissed University Communist Party members 
without giving them a chance to reform through self criticism.^* By replacing these 
members with a new set of leaders, which consisted largely of children of other party 
ofBcials who were friendly to herself and her husband, she further antagonized the 
Maoists. The disagreements of the SEM thus involved wide scale persoimel policies.
During this period, JQ became more vocal in her attacks on what she regarded as 
cultural deviance. She began to criticize artistic productions, directors, producers, etc., 
for presenting "wrong ideas," which may have meant merely a favorable or even neutral 
presentation of capitalism, such as having a well-dressed capitalist on a stage. She 
enjoyed "throwing her weight around," and arts personnel resented being told how to "do 
their job" by the wife of the Communist Party chairman. Witke mentioned that JQ began 
making "inroads" into television broadcasting in the early 1960s.^^ Robert Elegant, head 
of the Los Angeles Times' Hong Kong bureau during the CR, wrote that her initial 
"meddling" in opera and motion pictures was simply "regarded as a nuisance," and he 
even suggested that there was an element o f sexism involved; "Disarmed by their own 
prejudices, the moderates refused to consider a female a serious threat," and in light of 
future retributions against some of these theater figures, he added: "Had they known 
Mao's wife better, Mao's enemies might have feared the vengeful starlet more.'"*® A 
consequence of Mao's Yanan talk on the arts was that "a committee was set up for the 
specific purpose of revising old pieces to conform with Communist doctrine.'"** This 
committee was formed in 1948, indicating that the political apparatus was already in place 
for JQ's use in implementing her operatic revisions.
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JQ was named as having written her own opera, "Spark Among the Reeds." This 
later became "Shajiabang," which was one of eight original "model operas" produced to 
express the new political attitudes of the CR. Initially, this play concerned eighteen 
wounded Chinese soldiers who were hidden from the Japanese by an elderly woman, a tea 
house operator in the city of Sh*yiabang. When the soldiers recovered, the woman, an 
underground Communist agent, led them in an attack on Japanese forces in the area. JQ 
changed the plot, and had the troops led by their own oflBcer, who acted on inspiration of 
Mao's thought. JQ struggled with other composers and performers to rid "Shajiabang" of 
western influences.'*  ̂ Peng Zhen, mayor of Beijing, a Party ofiBcial who was influential in 
Beijing cultural circles, and a fliend of Liu Shaoqi, objected to allowing the revised opera 
to be performed. Publicity and funding were denied to JQ. These were disagreements 
that she would not soon forget. Peng was no longer a vague political opponent of Mao, 
but was now a personal enemy.
Under JQ's supervision, other plays were re-written to reflect the new view of 
"political correctness." Villains were dressed in rags, and kept ofiFcenter stage. Heroes 
and heroines, no longer representing upper classes, were portrayed as common people. 
They had all the "good lines," and even dismounted horses majestically. JQ was said to 
have advocated an artistic theory of "three prominences," which involved an emphasis on 
good characters, the story's heroes, and on the main hero.'*  ̂ These three prominences 
became important enough that they "had a strangle hold on the novel. Robert Hegel 
attributed the three prominences theory to both JQ and Yao Wenyuan, an accomplished 
Communist writer from Shanghai who was to become with JQ one of the Gang of Four. 
Hegel explained that it was "a theory that took to further extremes the theme of 
'revolutionary romanticism' developed in the 1950s," and that the new themes appealed to 
the less well educated.'*^
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In the spring of 1962, Mao asked JQ to draft an arts policy, which became the 
"May 16th circular" (a second "May 16th circular" was issued in 1966). This statement 
was presented to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and was a summary of 
Mao's arts policies as presented at Yanan.'*^ JQ's ofBcial position on the proper ftmction 
of opera contrasted with her private tastes, which ran to the salacious and erotic. She and 
her friend Kang Sheng spent two months together in the spring of 1962 in Hangzhou, 
where they "forced" theatrical groups to perform these entertainments.**  ̂ This was but 
one instance of the discrepancy between her preaching and her practice.
JQ had also been at work producing other "model operas," which served as 
prototypes of future Beijing operas, and which were in experimental production at this 
time. These models included five operas proper: "The Red Lantern," "Shajiabang," "Raid 
on the White Tiger Regiment," "On the Docks" and "Raiding the Bandits' Stronghold," 
which later became "Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy." This last opera, finished in 
1970, was an example of the 'three prominences' theory.*** Completed by 1966 were two 
ballets, "The White Haired Girl" and "The Red Detachment of Women." Another work 
was a symphony based on the music of "Shajiabang." These eight are regarded as the core 
of the Cultural Revolution dramatic presentations.**  ̂ None of the operas were set earlier 
than the 1920s, when the CCP began, and all but "On the Docks" involved the theme of 
war. They carried the messages of class struggle, continuing revolution, the teachings of 
Maoism, and the creation of heroic images of workers, peasants, and soldiers (i.e., "the 
masses"). The model operas became "immediately very popular" and were a cultural 
centerpiece of the CR.^® This is an important point, as many commentators on the CR 
view it as having little to do with culture. "Revolutionary Beijing Operas are the backbone 
of virtually all theatrical production in the country," and they were "directed by JQ, the 
militant wife of Mr. Mao, and a leader o f the CR," reported Seymour Topping of the New 
L in 1971.^* Yet, the operas were of dubious artistic merit. Deng Jûaoping,
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who was Mao's successor after a brief period when Hua Guofeng held that position, 
expressed a common opinion when he commented on the plays; "You just see a bunch of 
people running back and forth on the stage. Not a trace of art."^^ In a Acetious note, 
Deng remarked that he did not mind JQ's producing operas, as long as he did not have to 
watch them.^^ Deng, at least, was not intimidated by JQ
At a Beijing Spring Opera Festival in 1964, Mao's position with regard to artists 
had hardened: "It is necessary to drive all singers, poets, playwrights, and writers fi-om 
the cities to the countryside." Plays portraying "ghosts [i.e. gods, or fictions], emperors, 
princes, generals, ministers, scholars and beauties" were to be banned.^** The emperors, 
princes, etc., were to be replaced in artistic presentations by peasants and common people, 
who were the genuine heroes of the communist world. The goal o f artistic creation was to 
be the glorification of the common man.
This festival was not an annual event, and was apparently organized as an 
opportunity for JQ to present her new theatrical ideas. Colin Mackerras analyzed this 
festival: "Possibly the most important sign of the ascendency of JQ's views was the 
Festival of Beijing Opera on Contemporary Themes, held in the capital from 5 June to 31 
July 1964." JQ was given credit for having "persuaded artists to resist 'counter­
revolutionary revisionists' like Peng Zhen, who, it was claimed, wanted them to perform 
traditional operas." After this festival, "traditional dramas were performed in Beijing only 
on a few special occasions. . .  other cities soon followed Beijing’s example. Mackerras 
attributed the ideas of these operas to JQ, not to Mao or the Maoists.
Twenty-eight opera companies, representing nineteen provinces, cities and regions, 
presented thirty-seven new operas at this festival. JQ's "maiden speech" was given during 
this event, but it was not published until three years later, due, she told Witke, to political 
interference.^® Beijing Operas were an important influence in the daily lives of the Chinese 
people. For a number of years thereafter, the model operas represented the only "culture"
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available, and they were, as has been indicated, instruments of political indoctrination. 
NCnister of Culture Lu Dingyi, under whose authority the Festival was authorized (at the 
direction o f the Central Committee of the Politburo), commented that "The reform of 
Beijing Opera is a major event. It is not only a cultural revolution but also a social 
revolution. Edward Rice, however, questioned Lu's sincerity on this occasion.^*
These comments by a single high-ranking leader, appearing in CCP sources, were taken as 
the oflBcially approved position and indicated widespread acceptance. But %ain from an 
artistic standpoint, the plots o f the operas were predictable, and "The model operas spelled 
the end of the [moral] complexity that modem fiction had shared with the old literati for 
most of a decade."^® JQ also authored a book on the topic of these operas.®®
In an incident that was to become of major importance, Mao found one opera,
"Hai Rui's Dismissal," particularly offensive. Wu Han, author of the play, was a vice­
mayor of Beijing, although his duties in this capacity were honorary rather than political. 
Wu was a prominent writer and historian, a professor at Beijing University, and a leading 
authority on the Ming dynasty (1368-1644).®* He was one o f many Beijing intellectuals 
who were not in agreement with all o f Mao's policies, and was on good terms with Peng 
Zlien, Beijing's mayor (and was thus allied with Liu Shaoqi). The play was first performed 
in 1961. It had been gaining in popularity, and was performed in several locations. 
Ostensibly, it recounted an event in the life of an actual Ming Dynasty ofScial, Hai Rui, 
who angered the emperor by deciding a case involving land ownership and criminal 
misconduct of a wealthy landlord in favor of a peasant. Wu's play was interpreted by 
many, with justification, as a criticism of Mao, who had in 19S9 dismissed Peng Dehuai, a 
popular general and Minister of Defense, for criticizing the policies of the Great Leap 
Forward. In early 1965, Mao appointed JQ, Yao Wenyuan, and Zhang Chunqiao to 
prepare a critical review of this play. Yao Wenyuan was a talented communist writer with 
a reputation for biting sarcasm, and Zhang Chunqiao was at that time a journalist, a
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Director of Propaganda, and a high-ranking Party leader in Shanghai. (Yao Wenyuan and 
Zhang Chunqiao were both included in the subsequent "Gang of Four.")
The critical review was published in a November, 1965, editorial in the Shanghai 
RiBao, the daily newspaper, and was soon reprinted in the Beijing People's Daily. The 
play was denounced as containing "monsters and demons," and as being a "poisonous 
weed." It was to be a theme of the CR that catch phrases and slogans assumed the 
significance of a religious litany, due to their mind-numbing repetition, and soon monsters, 
demons and poisonous weeds, although never precisely defined, were found everywhere. 
But the lengthy editorial was more than a literary review. It outlined in detail the "political 
errors" o f the play, such as the portrayal of peasants as passive, or illustrating the principle 
that there was no need for a revolution to achieve justice fi-om a ruling class.®  ̂ Over one 
hundred further articles, representing both sides of the controversy surrounding the play 
and its review, were soon to appear.®  ̂ The main points at issue regarded the extent to 
which the play was to be taken as serious political theory, as the Maoists contended, or as 
simply an artistic work, to be interpreted on esthetic and academic grounds, as the Liuists 
advocated. Thus, the play struck at the deep divisions within the two lines of Chinese 
Communism. The controversy raised public awareness that political considerations would 
have an increasing impact on their daily lives. The review had fatal consequences for Wu 
Han, who eventually died of harassment, perhaps a suicide, and his family and supporters. 
Some historians regarded this "Hai Rui" incident as the point of origin for the CR
Because she had been entrusted with the preparation of the important review of 
"Hai Rui's Dismissal," JQ's stature and influence within the CCP increased. In December, 
1964, she served as representative fi-om Shantung Province in a National People's 
Congress. (Theoretically, this Congress was China's highest governing authority, 
but in feet it merely endorsed the decisions of the CCP leadership.) Her "oflBcial" political 
credentials were becoming established. She developed contacts within the military, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18
with People's Liberation Army (PLA) help, organized conferences on artistic topics from 
1964 to 1966.®** Although these forums were centered in Shanghai, they were "followed 
by a series of national, r%ionaL and local conferences throughout the army."®  ̂ In 
February, 1966, an unusual alliance was announced. A Forum on "Work in Literature 
and Art in the Armed Forces" was held; Lin Biao, head of the PLA and successor to Peng 
Dehuai as Minister of Defense, asked JQ to preside over this event. The political point of 
this alliance was to strengthen Mao's position within the PLA by having his wife direct 
their "cultural efforts!" In his address to this delegation, Lin Biao made Party leadership 
intentions clear; "Comrade Chiang Ch'ing [JQ ]. . .  has many opinions, and they are very 
valuable. You should pay good attention to them and take measures to insure that they 
are applied ideologically and organizationally." ®® Meisner noted "the curious spectacle of 
the army, assisted by Mao's wife, JQ, involving itself in the reform o f the traditional 
Beijing opera. "®̂  Later, in November of 1966, JQ was ofBcially named as a cultural 
advisor to the PLA. She was fond of emphasizing this new identification by wearing army 
fatigues, her new "costume."
JQ was asked to write a summary of this February forum. Her words were 
significantly and carefully chosen, and included the following points:
1 - there was ideological justification for a proposed revolution in culture
(referring to Mao's thoughts on culture presented at Yanan);
2 - there had been widespread soldier, worker, and peasant activity
in the Socialist Cultural Revolution over the past 3 years;
3 - the PLA was the chief instrument of the dictatorship of the
proletariat in China, and it must play an important role in the revolution;
4 - the CR must involve both destruction and construction; and
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5 - revolutionary and militant art and literary criticism by the 
masses was to be encouraged.®*
For JQ, "art criticism by the masses" meant destruction and elimination of art 
objects found to be objectionable. This criticism was to be carried out by the armed might 
and "aesthetic judgment" of the PLA, and it was an ominous sign that culture had thus 
become linked with militaiy force. "As JQ's power status grew, she became increasingly 
unscrupulous in her interference in Nfilitary afl&irs."®̂  This interference extended to 
recommendations for appointments to higher positions within the PLA, and reflected 
growing differences between JQ and Lin Biao.
The forum summary was written partially in response to a report, the February 
Outline, authored by Peng Zhen, who had been chairman of a five-member CR group.
This summary was known as "The Jiang Qing Thesis."^® For Mao, the CR was intended 
to involve political issues, while the February Outline, continuing a point of disagreement 
arising fi-om the "Hai Rui" controversy, urged that it be kept on an academic level. The 
February Outline report, and JQ's Thesis, represented "Two diametrically opposed 
documents," representing the "two lines" of Chinese Communism.^*
JQ also co-authored a second May 16th circular, four years after the original May 
16th circular of 1962, which further discredited the February Outline report. This was a 
strongly worded document, beginning "The Central Committee has decided to revoke the 
'Outline Report on the Current Academic Discussion Made by the Group of Five in 
Charge of the Cultural Revolution'," and continued "The outline covers up the serious 
political nature of the struggle." In intimidating, tough language, it presented detailed 
attacks on the February Outline, and listed ten theoretical errors committed therein, 
including accusations that it had violated the Marxist thesis that aU class struggles are
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political struggles7^ It included an attack on Peng Zhen, but gave a "gross 
misrepresentation o f what had occurred" in the five-member committee under Peng's 
direction. Misrepresentation and character assassination were to be common techniques 
of JQ in assaults on opponents. The circular repeated the idea that there was to be "no 
construction without destruction," and stressed the importance o f the PLA. One effect of 
the circular was to have the five-member committee replaced by a new eighteen-member 
Cultural Revolution Group. The circular was presented to the Central Committee in 
August.
In May, as the political events of 1966 unfolded, the eighteen-member Cultural 
Revolution Group essentially usurped the role of the Politburo and made political 
decisions for the country.^** Chen Boda, editor of Red Flag, the Communist Party policy 
journal, and who also acted as Mao's political secretary and speech writer, was head of 
this group. JQ was its "first deputy," a title given to emphasize that she was not just an 
ordinary group member. But Bamouin and Yu stated that JQ had "effectively taken 
charge" of this group, and that she "humiliated Chen Boda openly" when he criticized her 
"fi-equent violent outbursts. The historian Tang Tsou wrote that the transformation of 
the informal group consisting of JQ, Chen Boda, and their followers prior to the CR into 
the core of the CR Small Group illustrated the transformation of an informal group into a 
formal unit.^® By putting together the ideas that this informal group had become a formal 
unit, that it had usurped the fimction of the politburo, and that JQ controlled this group, 
the conclusion is that at this critical time, May-June, 1966, JQ was the single most 
influential individual in the Chinese Communist hierarchy. Indeed, there were not always 
clear lines of command within the Chinese government. JQ's proximity to Mao, together 
with her increased political prestige, made it difBcult for anyone in authority to deny her 
requests or demands. Did she always speak for Mao? Or, on whose authority did she act? 
These questions had no answers.
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Wang Li was a high-ranking party official, a member of the new eighteen-member 
Central Cultural Revolution Group, and was frequently given the task of writing official 
party documents. His detailed account of the early days of the CR, published in English in 
1994, made it very clear that JQ had assumed a central position at this time. "She [JQ] 
called daily meetings of this group" and "represented the Chairman when issuing 
directives. . JQ was not even a Central Committee member, but she was the one who 
seeded the standing committee members. This was rare in party history." When Chen 
Boda and Kang Sheng were absent from the meetings of the team drafting the May 16th 
Circular, "JQ [was] in sole charge." When Deng Xiaopeng was elected to the standing 
committee by a unanimous vote, JQ reprimanded Chen and Kang; "You all had votes, 
why did you let Deng get a unanimous vote? What were you doing?" JQ had begun an 
early campaign to discredit Deng, who was allied with Liu, and was a recognized rival of 
Mao. She was also at this time continuing to denounce Liu, and was criticizing Chen 
Boda for giving Liu editorial assistance. Even Kang "was very nervous. Wang's article 
was a complete testament, from a unique vantage point, to the influence that JQ was 
wielding in the spring of 1966.
On May 25, 1966, Beijing University (known as "Beida") experienced protests 
against the University president, who was also the head of the University Party 
Committee. These incidents were initiated by Nie Yuanzi, a member of the Beida 
Philosophy faculty, and were instigated, according to John Byron and Robert Pack, by 
Kang Sheng. As JQ was a personal acquaintance of Nie Yuanzi, the protests could not 
have occurred without her prior knowledge and approval. Nie made use of "wall posters," 
large hand-written signs hung for public display, to attack specific individuals by name. 
Mao soon gave his approval to these posters. In the confusion occasioned by these 
events, "Mao's endorsement of the posters electrified Beijing University," and individuals 
found themselves having to declare their allegiance in what became an escalating
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political controversy.^^ The text of Nie's posters was published on June 2 in People's 
Daily and was headlined "Big Character Poster Exposes Large Conspiracy."*® A public 
mass movement on June 18, designed to embarrass university administrators, turned into a 
riot. The poster attacks were taken as assaults on all intellectuals who were viewed as 
opposed to Mao's authority.
Mao's endorsement of the wall poster phenomena was no doubt hastened because 
the attack came in the intellectual center of Beijing, where he had political opponents of 
long standing duration. The posters, Mao felt, were a means by which the masses could 
express concerns, since many o f the usual media sources were under the control o f his 
"enemies. " "Posters written in big characters are an extremely useful new type of 
weapon," he noted.** In August, he contributed a wall poster of his own, "Bombard the 
Headquarters," which meant that people were to question or criticize members of the 
communist hierarchy whom they viewed as back-sliding. For a Chinese peasant, 
"headquarters" was the local government official to whom they were immediately 
responsible. This slogan was an attempt by Mao to enlist the masses in his effort to rid the 
Party of corrupt local cadres, and was in keeping with his "anti" campaigns of the 1950s.
Wall posters may seem a quaint way of communication, but they were a dramatic 
and effective means of attracting attention. They gave the appearance of coming 
spontaneously from "the people" rather than from government sources. Wall posters were 
a first indication that someone could expect trouble for being accused of being a counter­
revolutionary, or a "capitalist roader." They were avidly watched, especially by people 
fearful of being named, who began to worry about who was for them and who was against 
them. While the use of wall posters was not new (they had been used in student 
demonstrations as early as the 1920s), their occurrence became widespread throughout 
China during the CR.*^ Wall posters did reveal some scandals, but they were also used to
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exaggerate, manufecture, or exploit spurious grievances. The New York Times referred 
to wall posters as "uniquely Chinese ideological weapons."*^
On June 1 of 1966, JQ presented a speech explaining that the purpose of the CR 
was to "uproot revisionism."*^ Also in June, the PLA took over the People's Daily and 
an editorial urged "the masses" to "sweep out all monsters and ghosts," by which was 
meant bourgeois, capitalist and religious ideas and superstitions. This was the very 
language of JQ, extended from the field of the arts to the broader political arena, and 
showed that her influence had expanded b^ond the sphere of the arts. As one indication 
of this trend, older films were removed from public circulation. JQ became Secretary to 
the Standing Committee of the Politburo in June, even though she was not then a 
Politburo member.*^ And at Beida on July 22, she gave a radical speech urging that "It is 
time to overthrow the bourgeois academic clique."*®
A letter from Mao to JQ dated July 8, 1966, suggested that she pay attention to 
the problem that Communist parties world-wide were abandoning Marxism. This 
indicated that Mao had accepted JQ as a person with whom he could share problems of 
international political concern. He cautioned her that she should not become "dizzy with 
success," a reference to the achievements as he saw them at that time, of the CR. He 
noted that not all of the "rightists" of the party could be overthrown at once — and added 
that more ghosts and monsters would be eliminated when more of the movement was 
launched "after seven or eight years. "*  ̂ How little Mao, or anyone, knew then of the 
consequences of the events that he had initiated.
Another phenomena, the establishment of a "cult of Mao," also arose in the 
summer of 1966. Lin Biao, head of the PLA, authorized publication and widespread 
distribution of the book Quotations of Chairman Mao, better known in the West as The 
Little Red Book. Mao's birthplace was made into a Chinese mecca. It was in contrast to 
his attempts to keep out of the limelight at this time that Mao allowed this to happen.
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It is easy to explain his actions as being motivated by a desire to have his name and 
prestige promoted and prominent at a time he was about to launch the CR, and this may 
be true in part. But there was another, subtler, reason that may have been a factor here. 
One way in which this cult following was expressed was this:
Long live the great Communist Party of China!
Long live the great leader. Chairman Mao!
Long live the great and invincible Mao Zedong's thought!**
This expression gave prominence to the thought of Mao, as if that was in some way 
separable from the man himself. It is possible that Mao wished the masses to adhere to his 
thou^t, which would in any case outlive Mao the person, and it was to be his 
revolutionary ideas that were to be the core of the communist expansion into the mental 
lives of the people. And who, it would be thought by many, understood the thought of 
Mao better than Madame Mao?
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CHAPTER 2
JIANG QING ON STAGE 
Center Stage: 1966-68
As the CR began, JQ had taken on a political importance of her own. She was 
also becoming important to others as a conduit to Mao. The historical record of China of 
this period presents Mao as such a dominate political leader that it is easy to regard JQ as 
"merely" Mao's wife. Mao, so the story that we have been conditioned to believe goes, 
was the political leader and controller o f China's destiny. Having been indoctrinated with 
that scenario, it is not easy to accept the possibility that at critical points in reaching that 
destiny, it was "Mao's wife," not Mao, who was making political decisions. As China 
entered the years of the CR, officials showed less concern with "leading the country" and 
more concern with personal survival. Policy decisions were replaced by personnel 
decisions. It is the position of this thesis that JQ made these decisions for the "radical" 
clique in this period, and that she was a spokesperson for Mao when Mao was declining to 
speak for himself.
On August 8, 1966, the pieces were in place. At the Eleventh Plenary Session of 
the Eighth CCP Central Committee, a program referred to as "The Sixteen Points" was 
adopted, and the CR became official policy. To distinguish this program from cultural 
efforts that had preceded it, and to give it an exclamation point, it was called "The Great
31
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Proletarian Cultural Revolution." Important features of this program decreed that it 
would "touch people's souls," that "courageous and daring pathbreakers" would carry out 
the æms of the revolution (these daring pathbreakers would be the notorious Red Guards), 
and that old ideas, culture, customs and habits would be changed. Productive segments 
of the economy (that is, industry and agriculture), as well as PLA members, and scientists, 
were to be exempted from disruption by the revolution.* Maurice Meisner, the noted Mao 
scholar, referred to the Sixteen Points of August, 1966, as "the charter" of the CR.^
In the revolving door of the Chinese political hierarchy, Liu Shaoqi was out as 
Mao's chosen successor after this session. He remained virtually powerless until his death 
in 1969. Mao had at first advocated moderation in dealing with Liu, while JQ had 
advocated extremism and his removal; "The Chairman's original intention was only to 
demote Liu at the Eleventh Plenary Session." When Liu made a self-criticism that Mao 
thought was very good, JQ objected to it, called it "terrible," and Liu had to continue with 
his "confession." Later, Mao added '"If they [Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and Chen Boda] want 
to overthrow [Liu], then let them do it!"'^ Professor S. K. CHiosh wrote "It was she who 
was mainly responsible for harassing and humiliating the former Head of State, Liu 
Shaoqi, and the former Party Secretary, Deng Xiaoping and it was at her insistence that 
Liu Shaoqi and Marshals He Long and Peng Dehuai were persecuted."** In the matter of 
Liu Shaoqi, JQ's view prevailed.
Another point o f disagreement between Mao and JQ also came after the Eleventh 
Session. At a joint meeting of the Standing Committee and the Cultural Revolution Group 
members called by Mao, "The Chairman instructed the session to criticize Liu Shaoqi. Lin 
Biao and JQ were both of the opinion that Liu was not the chief threat, but that the chief 
threat was Deng [Xiaoping].. . therefore, they ignored the Chairman's instructions and 
lined up people to criticize Deng." Deng, "forced to hand over his work" to Kang Sheng
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told Kang "I can no longer carry on."^ This was not an isolated attack on Deng. JQ "led 
a campaign to get Deng Xiaoping expelled from the CCP, as being a capitalist 
roader and enemy of the people."® The result of these political maneuverings was that, at 
the instigation of JQ and Lin Biao, both Liu and Deng lost their influence. As an 
indication of Mao's growing inaccessibility, he was not at this meeting.
Wang Li stated that JQ was also opposed to Zhou Enlai as early as September, 
1966, when she was "ready to get the Premier," and "Jiang Qing's machinations put the 
Premier in an obviously difficult position." As an example of these machinations, "After 
the central work conference [in October, 1966] Jiang Qing ousted Wang Renzhong and 
Zhou Rongxin by uttering only one comment. . .  Zhou Rongxin was the Premier's chief 
aide in handling the Red Guards. He was abruptly ousted to hurt the Premier.. .  The 
Premier later told me: 'This event more than any other put me in a defensive position.'"^ 
Wang revealed the existence of yet another governmental agency in which JQ was 
wielding influence. "The Central Case Examination Group" was parallel with the Central 
Cultural Revolution Group, and evaluated conduct of party members. "JQ asked Kang 
Sheng to suggest to the chairman the setting up of special case investigations on Liu, 
Deng, and Tao [Tao Zhu, an ally of Liu Shaoqi and Head of a Propaganda Department]. 
Mao protested: "It can't be done. They are all standing committee members elected by the 
Eleventh Party Plenary Session of the Central Committee.' JQ's reply: "Well do it 
nevertheless. Well include them all in Peng's [Peng Zhen] case.'" JQ "repeatedly stressed; 
T will be in charge of the cases and will be directly accountable to the Chairman.'"*
Wang's entire report, written from the perspective of a high government insider 
and participant in these events, reflected a major concern with JQ and her activities during 
this period. The incidental way in which he recorded her actions indicated that they were 
not unusual. There was a general acceptance of JQ's political role, and a deference to her 
opinion. Later, on May 1, 1967, for instance, "the Premier ordered that day's Renmin
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ribao [People's Daily] recalled and reprinted." The reason was to put the names of the 
Cultural Revolution Group members above those of the Central Committee members;
"the Premier had misgivings about JQ making a big deal about it after the paper came out. 
JQ's position then was already above that o f the Politburo and secretariat."^
During these early days of the CR, JQ was already at work undermining Liu 
Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and 2%ou Enlai. Her supporters included Lin Biao (head of the 
PLA), Chen Boda (Mao's secretary), Kang Sheng, Yao Wenyuan, Zhang Chunqiao and of 
course Mao himself.
The revolution envisioned by JQ and her group was to be no small revision, or 
passing fad for the arts. It was to be a wholesale program on a national scale to force 
people to rethink their values and social roles. Mao perceived that the class struggle 
needed to become sharper in the continuing war between the bourgeois and "counter­
revolutionaries." Professor An Tai viewed the CR as a "spiritual" movement, designed to 
mold Chinese Communism into Mao's image of Communism as perpetual, total struggle.*® 
In a broad sense, "culture" involved "education," and culture was to be the tool by which 
the masses would be re-educated. This revolution did not involve education in the 
traditional sense, as schools were closed in June of 1966. (The original temporary 
suspension of schools was extended to a period of four years.) Nor was this re-education 
to be an easy, painless, process. It was to involve more than government propaganda 
campaigns, and more than simple, individual brainwashing. It was to be a way in which 
people would be forced to look within themselves for self-criticism, and to rely upon 
group support to discover correct ways o f thinking. Old thought patterns were to be 
abandoned; the psychology of self-interest, and its political manifestation in capitalism, 
had truly to be rejected.
This was to be a revolution, an idealistic revolution at that, to purge peoples' minds 
of such "false beliefs" as the primary importance of their own welfare and well-being. The
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cultural revolution was to strike at the foundation of human nature, at the very ways 
people think and believe. The virtues of concern or regard for others, or consideration for 
the importance of the group, were to be the primary and sole virtues. Robert Elegant 
described the CR as "history's single most audacious endeavor to transform the essential 
character of a nation, a society, and hundreds of millions of human beings."** Given the 
Marxist philosophical view of the inevitability of communism on an international level, the 
CR was designed to transform the thinking of all mankind. Eric Sevareid, an American 
journalist, grasped this essential feature of the CR when he asked another American 
journalist, James (Scotty) Reston, "But you don't believe, do you Scotty, that they’re 
going to succeed, by social means, by political means, of changing the nature of the human 
mind?"*  ̂ This question was posed as an afterthought within the context of a general 
discussion of Reston's visit to China in 1971, and was given little notice.
The CR is understood to be the creation of Mao Zedong, and to a large extent it 
was. But this paper will examine the significant and pivotal role played by JQ in this 
compelling drama. Who, but a person experienced in the craft of the theater, could evoke 
the emotions of the masses (a captive national audience existing btyond the artificial 
constraints of spectators in a theater), and stir them to action on the world's stage? Who 
had experience in the arts, and knew the communist principles to be applied there? Who 
desired the center of the stage, and the applause of the crowd? JQ was the perfect person 
for this highly visible role, which exactly fit the character of Lan Ping, the actress. At the 
precise moment in Chinese history when Mao needed a new weapon to neutralize his 
political opponents and promote his political agenda, his wife was leading a reform 
movement in the Chinese performing arts. Culture became of primary significance, and 
aligned with education. The Cultural Revolution was bom, and Madame Mao was ready, 
experienced, prepared, and eager to act as its spokesperson. Terrill noted that "It was a
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coincidence of great importance that JQ was both a specialist in the performing arts and a 
resurgent figure within the Mao court. But this was no coincidence. JQ had actively 
and deliberately created the circumstances of this situation, which represented a perfect 
psychological and historical union between a pa*son and an idea.
One point of the sixteen point agenda was that members of the bourgeoisie were 
still trying to use old ideas, culture, customs, and habits to corrupt the masses. These four 
concepts — ideas, culture, customs and habits — which very much define the essence of a 
nation, became the "four olds." Rejection and elimination of the four olds became rallying 
points of the early stages of the revolution. The attempt to change a nation in its 
fundamental character by government edict was to entail resistance, horror, bloodshed, 
and tragedy. The "Anti-Four Olds" campaign was a far, far different program than, for 
instance, an economic Five Year Plan.
The "daring pathbreakers" of the Sbcteen Point Program proved to be Red Guard 
(RG) members, who, in the initial stages of the CR, were groups of Chinese youths, many 
of them students, organized by Mao. From August through November of 1966, between 
11 and 13 million Chinese youths came to Beijing for a series of eight rallies. The London 
Times reported JQ's presence at the opening of one of these rallies, and noted that she 
"has recently emerged fi-om years out of the news to play an important part in the CR." 
These youths were to form the core of the RG movement. They were a paramilitary force 
used by JQ, and the early years of the CR were characterized by the actions of these RG 
groups. The Sixteen Point Program was ambiguous both in defining the extent to which 
"the masses," who were essentially these RG units, would be permitted to use violence to 
enforce the new views, and in a vague distinction between "good" and "bad" party 
members. These ambiguities allowed for differing interpretations of the program's intent, 
and RG units soon engaged in government sanctioned rampages against "bad" elements. 
The slogan "destruction before construction," which had been revived at the Eleventh
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Session, suggested that violence by the RGs would be tolerated, and RG groups were 
quick to react to this suggestion.
JQ was now speaking with political authority. She, and others of the CR leaders, 
warned these RGs of a "stormy class struggle," and of the need to eradicate "the four 
olds." RGs were urged to question parental and pedagogical authority, and "drag out 
capitalist readers." T h ^  were told to carry out a process of struggle-criticism- 
transformation, which bore an analogy to a individualized version of Marx's thesis- 
antithesis-synthesis triad. In practice, this process became one of coercion and 
intimidation. The American historian Edward Rice spoke of this period as "The 
Unleashing of Madam Mao," although if the premise of this thesis is correct, she needed 
no unleashing. Rice confirmed that at this time "she appeared to have become the de facto 
leader of the Cultural Revolution Group," and that "it was the purge aspects of the CR 
that were uppermost in her mind."^^
Persons purged included lower ranking cadres as well as members of the CCP 
upper hierarchy. But the effects of the destructive phase of the CR were felt through all of 
Chinese society. Any person, on any whim, could be targeted, harassed, and "criticized."
In the apt phraseology of Jonathan Spence, persons could be subject to "allegations of 
unspecified crimes committed at unspecified times. Franklin W. Houn, bom and 
educated in China, was a member of the Chinese GMD government firom 1946 to 1948, 
and in the 1960s was a Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts.
He was in a position to see China through Chinese eyes without fear of government 
censorship or reprisals. Houn reported that thought reform had been a well-established 
aspect of Chinese education under communism, and typically consisted of three phases; 1 
- group identification, 2 - personal and emotional self-criticism and confession, and 3 - 
denunciation of one's reactionary or bourgeoisie father, and rebirth into the new 
communist order. The organized "struggle meetings" that took place in the CR were a
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phenomena that expanded and brutalized this procedure. These meetings were forms of 
kangaroo courts designed to humiliate and elicit confessions.
OflScially, JQ was one person in authority over RG groups, and her use of these 
units was at times particularly effective. Her theatrical abilities enabled her to arouse their 
passions and motivate them to action against targets deemed objectionable. By convincing 
them that they, the common people, were the real heroes of life, she provided government 
sanction for them to act as judge, jury, and executioner. Kamow reported that "[JQ] 
carried enormous weight with the radicals," and "the young radicals admired JQ."^^ One 
RG member wrote that "Although JQ was nominally advisor to the Red Guards, we did 
not think much of her at aU," but this seemed to be an isolated opinion. The New York 
Times reported that "The stenographic record of CR rallies, carried by RG papers, suggest 
that these leaders show an almost obsequious deference to Miss Chiang."^^ There was no 
central, coordinated control of the diverse RG organizations, and local RG groups 
functioned very much autonomously. But the authority under which RGs operated rested 
in the government headed by Mao, and the voice of that government was that of JQ.
While she could not have directed or been aware of all their actions in detail, she praised 
the RGs "in their search o f bourgeois cultural remnants," and commended them, "you have 
done an excellent job.
"Scholars had supposed that young people almost arbitrarily joined one or another 
of the RG factions," wrote Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen, and Jonathan Unger. These 
writers rejected this supposition, and argued that choices of joining a RG unit "were more 
theoretically based in antagonisms over class issues, in high schools preceding the CR."^^ 
They traced RG membership to such issues as class tensions, and the lack of future 
opportunities. But RG groups were complex and diverse; one Cantonese worker 
estimated that there had been eighty-five separate RG organizations in his factory, and that
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"the situation appeared as confusing to the Chinese as it did to the outside world.
Peggy Durdin, in The New York Times Magazine, reported that there were from "two to 
twenty RG groups in each school, oflSce, and fectory."^'* In view of this complexity, it is 
doubtful that any choice of a RG unit was simply motivated.
The government, under the guise of promoting revolution, had many RG members 
sent to work in the countryside. There, th ^  were isolated and essentially imprisoned. 
Forgotten by the government they believed they had served, they too became victims, as 
real as those they had victimized.
Although no reliable figures on the number o f persons victimized during the CR 
will ever be available, the numbers are so large as to lose meaning. Rodzinski estimated 
that "A total o f729,000 people were 'fi-amed and persecuted,' of whom 34,900 were 
'persecuted to death.' Hoyt stated in even more general terms that "Before the CR 
ended, 500 million people, or three-quarters of the people of China, were sorely hurt and 
millions were killed. Accounts published later of personal hardships endured during
this time are called the "scar literature."
JQ had more than an advisory role as the early events of the CR unfolded. In 
October, for instance, Zhou Enlai prohibited RG units in Beijing from going to Tibet. The 
Chinese military "representative" in Tibet was General Zhang Guohua, who was allowing 
local RG units there to proceed with the destruction o f the "four olds," but he was 
apparently unhappy when th ^  began to "bombard the headquarters," when those 
headquarters were his own. JQ, however, authorized five youth groups to go there, 
apparently with the purpose of forcing Zhang to be more loyal to Mao. When Zhou 
ordered these units back to Beijing, JQ granted permission for them to stay, and JQ's 
orders prevailed. She was not beneath enforcing her views in the face of the highest 
opposi t ion.Zhou Enlai was a voice of the "moderates"' throughout the CR, a position 
which put him in opposition to JQ and other "radicals."
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JQ's rise in the CCP hierarchy paralleled to some extent that of her friend, Kang 
Sheng, who was noted as having risen from 16th in line at the beginning of 1966 to 7th by 
August of that year.^* Kang had held a number of intelligence positions throughout 
his career, but preferred a background role o f "advisor" to Mao. These positions included 
heads of a "Social Aflfeirs Department," which overlooked internal security issues and 
gave him control of secret service personnel, and of an "International Liaison 
Department," which coordinated business with Communist organizations in other 
countries, and controlled various police, security, espionage, and special agent groups.
His underlings were reportedly among the worse offenders o f cadres exhibiting high life 
styles and bourgeousie tendencies. It is not clear to what extent they were targeted during 
the revolution. He had the reputation of being Mao's "hatchet man," was thought of as 
China's version of Russia's Beria, and was regarded as being ruthless and brutal. Much of 
Mao's authority, Byron and Pack suggested, was due to the little publicized role of Kang's 
strong-arm tactics. "It was Kang who ultimately decided the fate of most of the high 
cadres hauled from their offices by the Red Guards.
In November of 1966, with the CR well under way, JQ's appointment as cultural 
advisor to the PL A was confirmed. In commenting on this role, Xie Tang Zhong, a high- 
ranking official in the PLA cultural department, remarked that "Her appointment is an 
important decision for strengthening the revolutionisation of our army's cultural work and 
for making it more militant. On this occasion. Time magazine used stronger language; 
"She is now the deputy director of the CR's subcommittee and the sole advisor to the 
PLA's purge group. This appointment was more than simply honorary, as it gave JQ 
censorship control of the arts and the enforcement authority o f the PLA.
JQ used this occasion to make a speech which summarized many of the 
developments in the progress of the CR She mentioned her convalescence period of the 
late 1950s as a time when she noticed "unacceptable ideas" in the theater, and formed the
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idea of merging culture and politics. She referred to "criminals" of the Ministry of Culture 
(who were the allies of Liu Shaoqi, but in the political style of the time, they were 
unnamed, so that everyone would worry), and emphasized the purgative aspects of the 
arts. Her rhetorical questions regarding the necessity of rejecting classical art forms that 
did not fit socialist ideological content was met with responses of "Yes! Yes!" fi"om the 
audience. There were again reminders that Mao had provided a philosophical justification 
for this transformation in culture in his Yanan essay of 1942, when he said that "There is 
no such thing as art for art's sake, art that stands above classes or art that is detached fi'om 
or independent of politics," and that the criterion by which to judge works of art lay in the 
effects they had "on the masses in society."^^ "Hai Rui’s Dismissal" was mentioned with 
disdain, and her model operas were extolled. At the end of her speech, she added that 
"the struggle had to be conducted by reasoning and not by coercion or force. There must 
be no beating of people."^^
But it was much too late for this much too little disclaimer. The admonition to 
avoid violence, which was already well under way, was not taken seriously, as 
perpetrators of violence were not punished. JQ's rhetoric here paralleled the ambivalence 
toward the use of violence that was present in the sixteen point directive of the Central 
Committee of the previous August. Had Mao or JQ been serious about curtailing RG 
violence, the PLA would have been ordered to end it.
As an indicator of American perceptions of JQ at this time, Stuart Schram, writing 
about this speech soon after it was given, called it "an obvious and depressing example of 
a raucous and spiteful person enjoying her hour of triumph over the party authorities who 
have so long slighted her and finstrated her ambitions." But a few pages later, Schram 
was referring to JQ as "gentle and retiring. Kamow, too, noted the "increasing 
prominence of JQ" during this period, but saw her speechmaking role as one designed only 
"to whip up radical enthusiasm.
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November 1966 was also the time when control of the Beijing arts groups was 
transferred to a branch of the PLA. It was reported in the London Times that the PLA 
had "taken over" the Beijing Opera companies, the Philharmonic orchestra, and the song 
and dance ensemble "as a prelude to a new general offensive' against dissidents in 
literature and the art."^^ Whke commented that this was comparable to the Pentagon 
being put in charge of the Metropolitan Opera Company.^^ But this abstract comparison 
was not appropriate in the context of the political scene of China, where culture, politics, 
and military force were not so clearly delineated. The importance of culture in the military 
had a historical basis for the communists. At Yanan, the survivors of the Long March 
were military people, and theatrical productions there had a core of army members.
"Every army had its own dramatic group," reported Edgar Snow.^*
In late November, Mao went on a trip to the Shanghai area and "JQ took the 
center of the stage almost immediately after Mao's departure from Beijing.
HoUingworth added that in Mao's absence " JQ, acting on his orders, assumed a leading 
role in the public direction of the CR.'"*® Mao was in fact and in theory Chairman of the 
CCP, but he was leaving day-to-day operation o f the Party, and hence the government, 
and hence the country, to others, and specifically to JQ.
Although the Beijing Communist Party Committee members had already been 
removed from office, many of these leaders, including Peng Zhen, were arrested on 
December 3. These leaders included men "who had dominated the stage and screen world 
of Communist China," and were political opponents of Mao. They were to be struggled 
against, denounced, and humiliated. Mao did not return to Beijing until early January, 
1967. Rice's account of the nearly six-week period of Mao's absence included a virtual 
day-by-day chronology of JQ's activity in directing RG actions, which included the first 
struggle meeting of Liu's wife, Wang Guangmei."** JQ's animosity toward Wang 
Guangmei was particularly intense. Wang was from a wealthy and sophisticated frmily.
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had appeared "on stage" at Tiananmen Square at the founding of the PRC in October of 
1949, and was in many ways the person that JQ aspired to be.
In December o f 1966, JQ convened a forum, ostensibly for the purpose of 
curtailing Red Guard attacks. But the result of the forum was to allow RG units to enter 
into agricultural and manufacturing sectors of society, in violation of the original sixteen 
point program of the previous August. JQ and Chen Boda both urged seizure of the 
CCP's main labor organization, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.'*  ̂ Kamow 
attributed these orders to "the Maoists," not Mao himself. The policies were those of 
Mao, but Mao was adopting a less visible role in their advocacy. As the CR progressed, it 
was JQ who was the more visible spokesperson of the Maoist views.
Some workers, having for years been ill-treated and neglected by their local work 
unit cadres, took advantage of the tumultuous times to present their grievances. JQ 
publicly received the petitions of a group of workers on December 25, 1966. She belittled 
Xi Zhanyuan, a vice-minister of labor and the subject of these grievances: "The Ministry 
of Labor is simply a Ministry of Lords," she charged, bursting into tears (undoubtedly for 
dramatic effect) at governmental indifference to the workers' plight.'*^
In January of 1967, a group of radical students from Beijing took control of 
Shanghai radio and TV stations and denounced "economism," a term which referred to 
activities such as offering workers economic and material incentives for increased 
productivity, work slowdowns, and payoffs to workers for support against invading RGs. 
Economism in this sense was seen as an appeal to short-term individual interests, rather 
than long-term group goals, and so was contrary to the new thinking of the CR. Normal 
urban activities in Shanghai ceased: utility services were disrupted, transportation was 
halted, factory production ended and a "new" government was created by the RG leaders. 
General chaos resulted. After earlier praising these leaders for their accomplishments in 
ousting the established cadres, Mao had to admonish them for advocating what amounted
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to anarchism when events of the revolution became uncontrollable.'*'* This was one 
indication that Mao was attempting to distance himself from accesses of the CR, while of 
course continuing to reap political benefits. And on January 23, 1967, the PLA was 
authorized to support the Maoist rebel groups. "Army intervention in the CR was the 
major factor in shifting the balance of power in China's internal power struggle . . .  in 
favor of the Maoist leftists. "45
Mao is often quoted as having said that a revolution is not a picnic. The CR was 
to be no exception to this rule. Victims and casualties, even numbering in the hundreds of 
thousands, had to be expected, as in any revolution. JQ told Witke: "the battles were not 
good of themselves because they engendered loss of life and property. But at the same 
time they clarified contradictions between classes and promoted ideological and cultural 
transformations that were beneficial in the long run.'"*® She was not the first political 
leader to use ends to justify means. Even Mao himself was not completely happy with 
JQ's activity. On February 10, 1967, at a meeting of the Standing Committee, he "severely 
reprimanded" Chen Boda, and then JQ: "You, JQ, have high-flown aims but little ability. 
You're ambitious but incompetent. You look down on everyone else." JQ diverted this 
attack "entirely onto Chen," and to such a degree that "Kang Sheng claimed, 'She's forcing 
Boda to the verge of suicide." Later, she "pointed at Chen's nose and challenged "Go 
ahead and commit suicide. Go ahead! Youll be expelled from the party and called a 
traitor. Do you have the courage to commit suicide?" This was her attitude toward 
Chen, who, it will be recalled, was one of her allies. Wang added, in characteristic 
Chinese understatement, that the Cultural Revolution Group "was certainly not a solid 
bloc.'"*  ̂ The transactions of some of these meetings illustrated Terrill's observation that 
"personal grudges made playthings of policy isssues.'"** JQ's grudges, and the strength of 
her personality, aflfected Chinese politics for ten years.
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On April 4, JQ addressed student activists in Beijing, and explained that it was the 
duty of the PLA to support radical factions. She repeated this message on April 10 to the 
Military Affairs Committee, China's highest Army Council. These were attempts to 
restore peace between warring PLA and RG units. Kamow also quoted JQ as saying in 
April 1967: "There caimot be peaceful coexistence in the ideological realm. Peaceful 
coexistence corrupts.'"*^ This phraseology went beyond the usual political rhetoric and 
exhortations ascribed to JQ. Here, she was uttering political and philosophical theory, 
albeit theory of an easy, general nature. Perhaps these words were those of Yao 
Wenyuan, the gifted writer who had collaborated with her in composing the initial critique 
of Wu Han.
These speeches were more than just occasions for JQ to encourage RG forces to 
continue their course of "re-education." They presented situations in which she could 
announce policy. "During the 1st and 2nd quarter of 1967, the radical faction led by JQ 
had been dominant in the Maoist policy-making council in Beijing."®® JQ's speeches 
carried the full weight of the Politburo, of which she was a determining factor. In May, 
she presided over a Beijing rally commemorating the 25th anniversary of Mao's Yanan 
talks.
Also in May, 1967, a meeting was held in Beijing to appoint General Zhang 
Guohua, the military commander in Tibet, as head of a Revolutionary Committee 
governing neighboring Sichuan Province. Kamow recorded that JQ advised Zhang that 
the army's role there was to "minimize internal strife," which meant, in this context, that 
Zhang was to unify elements sympathetic to Mao and "subdue" his opponents. Zhang's 
loyalties may have been suspect, since he came, like Deng Xiaoping, from that province.
At a later conference on Sichuan, in March, 1968, JQ accused General Zhang 
"mercilessly" of having foiled to properly promote the CR there, and asserted that "We 
don't know where your sympathies lie."®* Kamow's comments revealed both that JQ was
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a regular participant in meetings of this sort, and that she was not a silent participant. And 
she did not hesitate to berate generals for political shortcomings.
In recorded accounts of this period, fewer and fewer pronouncements of Mao are 
found, and more and more proclamations of "Maoists," who were JQ and her "clique." 
Elegant, however, overstated the case when he claimed that "the Chairman had not made a 
single public statement during the entire revolution."®^
In a speech on April 13, JQ revealed that she had acted as "a roving sentinel for 
Mao, observing events in culture, education, and international affairs."®® In this way, JQ 
was also gaining experience and knowledge for herself. At a July 22 RG rally, she 
repeated the token advice that RGs were to attack by words, but defend by force.®** As 
RG rampages were widespread at this time, her feeble advice for them to "defend by 
force" was just more rhetorical camouflage similar to the way government officials refer to 
military forces as being based in a "Ministry of Defense."
A more serious point of difference between JQ and Mao arose in June of this year. 
Wang reported that Mao was opposed to the use of force in the CR: "Ever since seizure 
of power broke out, he [Mao] had ceaselessly opposed armed struggle, assault, and 
looting.. . .  The Chairman also opposed "kangaroo courts;' he instructed members of the 
Cultural Revolution Group to investigate and dissolve all such courts wherever they were 
found and to release all victims." Much of this talk was apparently simple political 
verbiage, as kangaroo courts continued and victims were not released. But in June, even 
Mao's rhetoric changed. "If the Chairman had held on to this idea [of minimizing 
violence], the CR would not have had such serious repercussions. The fact was that he 
later began to think about it from another side."®® Wang did not add the obvious 
conclusion that it was on JQ's advice that Mao thought about the other side.
The most notable example of PLA reaction to RG actions occurred in the city of 
Wuhan in July of this year, 1967. In this incident, local PLA forces refused to yield to RG
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demands, and their resistance led to armed conflict and bloodshed. JQ used this incident 
to blame army elements for CR failures, thereby allowing army cadres to become targets 
o f RG sanctions.®® Byron and Peck wrote that Lin Biao actually had limited authority in 
controlling the vast PLA, and that "tough provincial commanders," reacting to events at 
local levels, were able to put down RG activities. On July 25, with Mao again absent from 
Beijing, JQ and Kang Sheng, during a Tiananmen Square RG rally, instructed RG leaders 
to "drag out capitalist roaders and counter-revolutionaries in the army" and to spread this 
information as coming from Mao (but in fact Mao did not approve of RG assaults on the 
PLA).®  ̂ In this instance, the radicals adopted belligerent and inflammatory language: 
arms were to be used to defend the CR with "life and blood." With regard to the 
interpretation o f this language, "Nobody encouraged the revival of violence more openly 
than did Mao's wife, Jiang Qing."®* The alliance of JQ and Lin Biao through the PLA, 
while perhaps never firm, had proved to be short lived. Hoyt attributed more grandiose 
aspirations to this pair: "What Mao did not know was that his wife and Lin Biao . .  . had 
decided to take power in China."®®
In August, JQ and Lin Biao initiated attacks on cadres of the Foreign Ministry, 
designed "to embarrass the Chinese government with foreign powers."®® A former RG 
member identified by Butterfield as "Lo" was later accused of being a member of an ultra­
radical group that took over this ministry. Lo claimed that "his group followed direct 
orders from JQ."®* The purpose of these attacks would be puzzling until it is realized that 
Zhou Enlai had assumed responsibility for this Ministiy the previous April. Foreign 
relations had been "paralyzed" (Kamow's word) throughout the CR, and these attacks 
were designed to reduce further Zhou's authority and prestige. The attacks expanded to 
include assaults on "diplomats of almost every foreign mission" in Beijing, and included
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the burning of the British embassy.®  ̂ The Chinese government, in an effort to regain loss 
of international prestige arising from these incidents, later tried and imprisoned at least one 
Chinese diplomat for these actions.®®
In early August, JQ "denounced the 5/16 (May 16th) group," presumably a semi- 
secret terrorist organization which was alleged to have instigated this burning, and was 
believed by some to be under the control o f Lin Biao.®** This speech illustrated as well 
that JQ had no reticence about publicly criticizing Lin, although they were still included 
together as part of "the radical faction." JQ, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng all spoke at a 
Beijing Municipal Party Committee meeting on September 1, and continued to blame the 
5/16 clique for counter-revolutionary activity. At this time, Zhou Enlai denied the 
importance of this group; "Dont magnify the question of the May 16th elements. It's not 
a big problem, only a question of some bad leaders."®®
On September 5, JQ made an important speech, representing Mao's views to a 
large meeting of delegates from Anhui province. She explained that her speech was given 
extemporaneously, claiming that Kang Sheng had dragged her there at the last moment. If 
that was true, the speech testified to JQ's ability to speak at length and on short notice on 
issues of the CR. The record of the speech showed that she was interrupted at one time 
by comments from Yao Wenyuan, who was also in attendance. In this speech, JQ claimed 
that she was opposed to armed struggle, and again attacked the May 16th clique, which 
she linked to spies of the United States, Russia, and even Chiang Kai-Shek.®® She urged 
the RGs to show some respect to the PLA, a view which may have been a reflection of 
Mao's realization that the violence of the RGs was not producing beneficial results. This 
speech came at a time when the PLA was beginning to take an active role in suppressing 
RG excesses. Further major speeches followed on September 14 and 15, to new 
propaganda teams of workers and soldiers, and in which she made some attempts to tone 
down CR violence and blame what violence there was on Chen Boda.®^
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A speech at a Beijing forum on literature and art in November provided a revealing 
insight into JQ's thinking. There, she spoke ominously of "accounts must be settled for 
the fifty days, for the seventeen years, and for the nineteen thirties as well."®* These 
accounts were for actions performed by Liu Shaoqi fi'om May to July, 1966, when Liu 
sent CR work teams to Universities, and which teams she viewed as having protected 
"dissident elements." The accounts to be settled also included transgressions of Mao's 
opponents for the entire period from 1949 to 1966, and even back to the 1930s, during the 
early years of struggle within the Party and against the forces of the GMD. Revenge 
against real or imagined wrongs o f the past was a motive for many of JQ's vindictive 
actions. %a Yan, a former boss of hers in Shanghai, and other Shanghai filmmakers, were 
humiliated and struggled against. X a had once given a role that she (as Lan Ping) 
wanted to someone else. These men were accused, thirty years later, of political 
deviations "recently uncovered."®® JQ's memory of past grievances was long, indeed.
In promoting idealistic aspects of the CR, JQ emphasized self-criticism, and an 
inward struggle to purify thought. "We are prosecuting two revolutions . . .  one to reform 
the objective world and one to reform the subjective world.. . .  Only when power is 
thoroughly seized from the Ego in the mind will it be possible to insure a complete victory 
in the struggle to seize power from the power holders who take the capitalist road."^®
This was a reaflBrmation of the idea that the CR was to be based on a complete revolution 
in human thinking, and that human minds had to be purged of thoughts of self-interest.
A second issue emphasized by JQ during the CR was the idea that people learn to 
do by doing. This was a repetition of one of Mao's themes, which was phrased as "we 
leam to swim by swimming." Given the future goal of a pure communist society, it may 
not be clear what steps will lead to that goal. So the CR became in some respects an 
experimentation with different means to attain that end; it was of no consequence that 
innocent people, or hundreds of thousands of innocent people, suffered in the process of
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reaching this higher good. The CR was the result of uniting this particular type of political 
single-minded thinking with an artistic and cultural emphasis.
There was a sense at this time that no one was in control in China. Elegant, 
speaking of the formal government, wrote that "China entered the winter of 1967-68 
devoid of even the pretense of a functioning central authority," and that "central power 
had been virtually destroyed in China by April, 1969. The Communist Party had been 
shattered, and the People's Government was the gaping facade of a gutted edifice."^* An 
Tai Sung stated that for the years 1967-72, "the PLA was running China, 
so that some semblance of order was maintained.
Meanwhile, JQ continued to make speeches. In January, 1968, she, Chen Boda, 
Kang Sheng, Yao Wenyuan and Zhou Enlai addressed an "important seminar" held for 
representatives from Hunan Province, which was designed to establish a Hunan Provincial 
Revolutionary Committee.^® Zhou was a master of diplomacy, and maintained his difficult 
position throughout this chaotic time. On March 27, JQ addressed PLA cadres.
Ostensibly, she was to explain "the process of recognizing double-dealers," but her speech 
was another attack on "traitors," who were this time the leaders of the "February Adverse 
Current." This was the five-member CR Group which had been headed by Peng Zhen.®**
In the May Day celebration in Beijing, she was observed as being "in the 9th leadership 
position, up from 19th in October of 1967."^® It was in 1968 that the popular slogan 
"leam from Jiang Qing" appeared throughout China. She was accepted as a political 
authority by the Chinese people, and it was in 1968 that she reached the peak of her public 
prominence.
Kamow wrote that JQ had become disenchanted with the course of the CR in early 
1968, and indeed she made few public speeches advocating CR reforms after that time. 
Perhaps the political fervor of the movement had simple bumed out, although the CR was
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far from over, and RG and PLA units continued their numerous violent encounters. But 
on July 27, Mao, tearfully, it is reported, "in an attempt to destroy the monster he had 
invented, repudiated the Red Guards," because they had failed to unite and their persistent 
fighting was ruining the country.^®
JQ's declining enthusiasm with the CR may have coincided with Mao's own. But 
while her speechmaking diminished, her political activity did not. Vice Premier Li Fu- 
Chang, who was aligned with Zhou Enlai, was one object of attack. After this 
confrontation, JQ had "scored a victory," and she "soon began to appear on public 
occasions in the fifth place that Li Fu-chang had previously occupied." On June 24, Nie 
Changzhen, another vice premier and Chairman of the Scientific and Technolo^cal 
Commission, was attacked in a wall poster written by JQ's daughter, Li Min.^^ Nie was 
aligned with Beijing mayor Peng Zhen, and a fiiend of Fan Jin, who had replaced JQ as Yu 
Qiwei's lover in the 1930s.
On September 6 of 1968, the People's Daily declared a "decisive nationwide 
victory" in the CR. Indeed, early Western accounts of the CR contained such phrases as 
"by the time the CR began winding down in 1968."^* For these writers, the period of the 
CR was 1966-68. But in April of 1969, at the Ninth Party Congress, when Madame 
Mao was appointed to the Politburo, the themes of the CR were adopted as continuing 
national policy, and later historians dated the end of the CR with Mao's death in 1976.
The day after her Politburo appointment, JQ made an impromptu speech at a rally 
celebrating formation of provincial revolutionary committees throughout China, in which 
she commended the RGs, urged workers not to repress them, and added "I am saying this 
on Chairman Mao's authority."^®
Under JQ's direction, the effects o f the CR were felt across all aspects of Chinese 
society. Richard Kraus commented that established artists, not yet adjusted to the new 
political realities, found it easier to remain idle during this period rather than to run the
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risk of facing political disfavor.*® The effect on academic thinking and research was 
equally stifling. At the time of the subsequent trials of the Gang of Four, it was mentioned 
that the study of city planning ceased, as it "served the urban landlords," and the studies of 
finance, banking and accounting were tainted as "putting money first;. . .  research in our 
Institute of Economics was disrupted for more than a decade and the enthusiasm of our 
comrades was greatly dampened. People still fear and tremble."** Frederick Wakeman 
Jr., a prominent Mao scholar, visited China soon after Mao's death. In discussions with 
representatives of China's Institute of History of the Academy of Social Sciences, he 
reported one member as saying "Under the domination of Chiang Ch'ing [JQ] and Chung 
Ch'un-ch'iao [Zhang Chunqiao] there had been no opportunity for scholarly debate. If 
Chiang Ch'ing had felt that one particular historical interpretation or fact was correct, then 
no other viewpoint was tolerated."*^ Wakeman's point was that Chinese historians were 
subject to political control during the CR, but he incidentally verified that it was JQ who 
was responsible for that control.
American writer Harrison Salisbury spoke with History Professor Chun Hsi-chang 
of Fu Dan University in 1976. Chun recalled an incident when "orders came down fi'om 
the party for research about a 19th century Prime Minister, Li Hung-chang" which was to 
be used as an attack on Zhou Enlai. It had to be written "according to the new formula 
laid down by Miss Chiang and her associates for historical writing: 70% fact and 30% 
imagination," although sometimes, the professor added, the percentages were reversed. 
Salisbury recorded that "No feature films whatever were produced in China fi'om 1966 to 
1973." He wrote that "writers, composers, poets, artists are now beginning to emerge 
fi'om the shadows," and referred to "the nonpresence o f writers and artists" that he had 
found there on a previous trip to China in 1972.*®
Another methodology of CR leaders, illustrating the policy of "putting politics 
first," was made explicit at the time of the trials of the Gang of Four: "Data must be
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obtained with the needs of the struggle in mind and not for its own sake."*** This was in 
effect the grim political realization of the Western joke about fitting facts to conform to 
theory. The Cambridge History of China, in its Bibliographical Essays, stated that during 
this period, "few new books appeared, virtually all specialized journals ceased 
publication."*® JQ's influence was felt on the superstructure as well as the base of 
society.
By the end of 1968, much of the violence against civilians had ended. RG and 
PLA Actions continued fighting, but the CR entered a new phase. And JQ was to pursue 
yet another more ambitious objective.
In the Wings: 1969-76
At the Ninth Congress of the CCP (April, 1969), JQ, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao 
Wenyuan were elected to the Politburo. Writing of her career at that time. Professor An 
stated that "She is by far the most powerful woman in China, soaring within three 
years fi-om total obscurity to a seat in the Party Politburo." Her importance was 
emphasized, when An added "She has exercised authority second only to her husband in 
the past three years."*®
The new Standing Committee of the Politburo consisted of five men: Mao, Zhou 
Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, and Lin Biao. At that time, these five were the most 
powerful in China, the world's most populous country. How striking it is that JQ had 
close connections with each of these five: she was married to Mao, and a childhood fiiend 
of Kang Sheng. Although she was politically aligned with Chen Boda and other 
"radicals," she had dismissed Chen as being "weak," although he was among the most
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loyal of Mao’s supporters. She had feuded with the moderate, Zhou Enlai, whom she 
regarded as opposed to the aggressive policies of Mao's government, and was quarreling 
with Lin, who was selected by Mao at this Ninth Congress to be his successor as party 
chairman. JQ herself desired to be Mao's successor, and animosity between JQ and Lin 
Biao intensified over this issue.
Zhou Enlai gave the keynote address on October 1, 1969, in a celebration marking 
the 20th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic. The fact that this speech 
was given by the moderate, Zhou, indicated a decline in the visible power of the radicals. 
The excesses of the CR began to be blamed on those who were "too radical" Some RG 
members were held accountable for their crimes, and some over-zealous party activists 
were purged as they had purged unto others. Chen Boda was one leader of the highest 
rank who was discredited. He was accused of "ultra-leftist'' inclinations, and lost political 
importance. And JQ, while removed fi'om the spotlight, remained busy in the wings.
For one thing, she was again active in cultural affairs. The New York Times 
reported that she was in charge of revising the model operas, which began to show "more 
emphasis on selflessness for the sake of the masses and on discipline than in the earlier 
revisions."** The new emphasis was designed for a time of "internal consolidation and 
external threat," rather than (as in the earlier revisions) a time of struggle for political 
power. She introduced no new model operas. Having tasted higher powers, perhaps she 
could not return to the less ambitious activity of artistic creation. Or, she and her public 
may have just become tired of the same operatic themes.
For another thing, JQ was not absent fi'om the political arena. Newsweek had 
written of her supposed demise in 1968; "At the frenzied pinnacle of China's Cultural 
Revolution, a single word fi'om Chiang Ching - the dowdy, demoniacal wife of Mao Tse- 
tung - was enough to make strong men tremble ..  . Recently, Chiang Ching has held her
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tongue. . .  they [the radicals] have been consigned to political oblivion."*® Two years 
later, Newsweek presented a revised opinion. After noting that "neither the Cultural 
Revolution nor the internal struggle for control had run their course," Newsweek 
continued: "Still more interesting to China watchers was the re-emergence into the 
political fray of Chiang Ching, the wife of party Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and, as a 
member of the Politburo, China's leading voice of cultural affairs." Having reinforced the 
preconceptions of JQ as "Mao's wife" and as important for "cultural affairs" (views 
attributed to unnamed "China watchers"), Newsweek provided an insight indicating 
worldwide adoption of her radical ideas; "Mao's statement of May 20 [1970], extolling 
the atmosphere of world revolution - [is] in line with the more militant views being 
attributed to Chiang Ching and her followers."®®
The Witke interviews were conducted in August of 1972. It might be supposed 
that an account of JQ's accomplishments in the years 1970-72 would form an important 
part of this unofficial biography. However, Witke's account only briefly mentioned this 
period. In fact, one major activity of JQ during this time was the denunciation of Lin 
Biao, who was no longer alive, and his supporters, many of whom were very much alive. 
The circumstances surrounding Lin's death formed an incident of major importance for the 
Chinese political scene and for JQ's future.
Public information about this incident was not quickly available. The Chinese 
government on January 13, 1972, announced to party officials that Lin, with his wife and 
son, had died in a plane crash near the Soviet border in September of 1971. But it was not 
until June 26 of 1972 that details of an official version of his death were released.®* The 
government also announced that there was irrefutable evidence that Lin and his son had 
plotted, with others, assassination attempts against Mao. The delay in publicizing the 
event, however, aroused suspicions about the facts of the case. The scenario presented by 
the government was that after the plots were discovered, Lin died, accidentally and
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incidentally, in an attempt to flee the country. Although Lin had been designated as Mao's 
successor in 1969, he and Mao had a "confi'ontation" at a conference in Lushan in late 
August of 1970, and th ^  had feuded openly ever since.
Previously, JQ had perhaps flimsy reasons to disapprove of Lin, and her attacks 
were of a milder nature. For instance, eleven photos taken by JQ appeared in China 
Pictorial, a Teking propaganda magazine," in August of 1971. These included a picture 
of Lin without his hat on, showing a clearly bald head, "a subject about which he was 
sensitive."®  ̂ Such an action was a deliberate attempt to embarrass and discredit Lin.
But the uncovering of these plots revealed Lin as a traitor, and he and the 
mysterious May 16th clique that was reputedly under his control came to be blamed for 
the evils of the CR. Past points of disagreement between Lin and Mao, or Lin and JQ, 
now became issues signifying early signs of treachery, and were traced back many years. 
Lin was alleged, for instance, to have undermined JQ's efforts at film production in the 
early 1960s. No doubt delighting in the task, and now with a certified villain to attack, 
and a dead villain at that, JQ became a chief designer of a campaign to expose and 
discredit Lin. Wherever the facts of responsibility for excesses and evils of the CR may 
have rested, Lin and his followers became easy scapegoats. In fact, at its strongest, the 
5/16 group was never of much importance and had few members, although thousands of 
individuals were purged and persecuted because of alleged allegiance to this largely 
fictitious organization. Dietrich referred to this group as "possibly nonexistent."
Bamouin claimed that "In the late 1970s, it was officially admitted that the group was an 
invention." And Terrill stated bluntly "Yes, JQ faked the truth about Lin Biao," referring 
to her accusations that Lin had tried to poison her, and that he had instructed film 
laboratories to sabotage her movies.®®
Lin's death in 1971 came at a time when relations between China and the United 
States were unexpectedly becoming fiiendlier, with the result that then President of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
United States Richard Nixon visited China in February, 1972. At the time of this visit, JQ 
was acting as spokesperson of communist ideas. At a performance of the opera "Red 
Detachment of Women," Nixon asked her for the names of the writer, composer, and 
director, and was told that the work was "created by the masses," affirming the party 
doctrine that groups, not individuals, were the creative forces of artistic achievement.®** 
She was also involved in the visit to China (Shanghai and Beijing) by the Philadelphia 
Orchestra in September of 1973, and whose music she attacked, in the Spring of 1974, as 
being "bougeois."®® These American visits to China also indicated a diminished role of the 
radical faction in determining foreign policy. "The Politburo members in the extremist 
faction, JQ, wife of Mr. Mao, and Kang Sheng, who had been concerned with security 
matters, seem to have lost some influence. A third, Chen Boda, formerly Mr. Mao's 
secretary, had not been seen publicly since /Wgust, 1970," recorded newsman Seymour 
Topping.®® In September of 1974, Imelda Marcos, at that time wife of Philippines' 
President Fernando Marcos, visited China and was hosted there by JQ. The two women 
toured Xiaojinzhuang, which had been designed by JQ as a "tiny utopian proletarian 
culture" with about six hundred peasants.®®
The anti-Lin campaign became aligned with another anti-campaign, this one 
against Confucius, at the Tenth Party Congress in August of 1973. JQ chaired the 
committee organized to head the campaign to criticize these two.®* There were again 
references to the party being under the control of "the JQ faction."®® In the People's Daily 
of August 7, Confucius was referred to as "the thinker who stubbornly defends the system 
of slavery."*®® A combined Lin and Confucius attack lacked a common link, as Lin had 
no strong Conflician background. But the Confucian ethic severely restricted roles of 
women in society, and those roles precluded the opportunity for them to govern. Seizing 
on the obvious vulnerability of Lin, and seeking to prepare a way for acceptance of a 
woman ruler in China, the opportunity to combine the two campaigns was irresistible.
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It was widely understood, however, that the real target of this campaign was Zhou 
Enlai.*®* This campaign was analyzed by Frederick Wakeman, who decided that it was 
turned into "a movement to study the history of the struggle between Legalists and 
Confucians. This 'meticulously plotted trick' had been directed by Chiang Ch'ing. . .  
because she dared not name her real enemy, who was Chou En-Lai." *®® This revealing 
article indicated not only that Wakeman assumed that JQ and 2%ou Enlai were "enemies," 
but also that he attributed to JQ considerable political expertise. As Wu Han had 
indirectly attacked Mao through the use o f Hai Rui, so JQ took this indirect method of 
attacking Zhou Enlai.
In 1971 and 1972, JQ was busy with other plans which she did not reveal to 
Witke. In April of 1971, Mao had ordered the establishment of a central propaganda 
group, "a powerful organ controlling ideology, cultural, and propaganda activities."*®® 
This group was headed by Kang Shang, and included JQ. This propaganda machine was 
engaged in researching precedents of women rulers in China, and presenting histories of 
these rulers for public distribution. The purpose, of course, was to prepare the Chinese 
people for JQ's assumption o f Mao's leadership position. Wu Zetian (of the Tang dynasty, 
8th century) had ruled China for fifty years, and Empress Lu of the Han dynasty had ruled 
for sixteen. More recently, the Dowager Empress Ci Xi (1850-1908) had ruled for forty- 
eight years at the end of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). Disregarding the early CR notion 
that "old traditions" were to be rejected, and relying now on those traditions to establish 
authority, a nationwide publicity campaign was launched to legitimize the notion of a 
female head of state. As Kang became incapacitated because of illness, control of this 
operation passed directly to JQ in May of 1974. *®** HoUingworth acknowledged this 
transfer of power: "Throughout 1974 and 1975, diplomats and correspondents based in 
Peking realized that the media [were] under the direction of JQ."*®® While visiting China 
as part of the "ping-pong diplomacy" thaw in U.S.-China relations, James Reston sought
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information about this agency, but "we were not, oddly enough, able to get at the 
propaganda apparatus. It is a fontastic apparatus, centered somewhere in the Central 
Committee, with the primary voice of it being the People’s Daily in Beijing." *®® What was 
odd here was that Reston thought the prevention of his inquiries into this agency was odd.
Not long after Lin's death, Mao began to disparage JQ publicly, referring to her 
"wild ambition and general incompetence."*®® Mao also objected to JQ's 1972 interviews 
with Witke, which he viewed as simply a means of self-promotion and glorification. In 
July, 1974 and May, 1975, Mao also publicly objected to the "Gang o f Four" (Mao's own 
phrase), and warned JQ against forming cliques. In December of 1974, he spoke directly 
to JQ: "Dont form a faction. Those who form factions will fall down."*®* Other writers 
had noted the emergence of a quartet involving JQ. Hoyt stated that the Gang of Four 
was forming a visible group at this time.*®® And Zhao Yanqi (pseudonym), who had been 
asked to write an "official" account of Lin Biao's death, referred (in 1973) to the Gang of 
Four as "rapidly rising." * *® A letter from JQ to Mao dated November 12, 1974, was 
returned to her with a marginal note advising her "not to make many public 
appearances, not to approve documents, and not to organize a cabinet or act like a back­
stage boss."*** Mao, too, used theatrical terminology when referring to JQ's career.
Due, perhaps, to Mao's admonition for her to refrain from public appearances, 
there is little record o f her activities in 1975. In one speech in March o f that year, an 
Address to Diplomatic Cadres, she represented herself as relaying messages from Mao: 
"The pith and soul of Marxist-Leninism-Mao Tse-Tung thought are adherence to the 
doctrine of class struggle and the implementation of the proletarian dictatorship."* *® She 
spoke at that time o f a world-wide victory for Communism, and made suggestions about 
the proper conduct for Chinese diplomats stationed in other countries. In a letter to an 
agricultural conference dated July 2, 1975, she repeated the idea that the way to solve 
problems was "to arm our leadership with the theories of Marxism."* *®
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
But she did make one "important speech" at a national conference on "Learning 
from Dazhai in Agriculture," in early September, 1975. She urged "a gradual return to the 
original organizational concept for the communes, as th ^  had been developed in 1958" 
and for "poor and lower-middle class peasants to continue to wage class struggle in the 
villages." She could not resist, perhaps, blaming China's agricultural problems on an old 
foe, Liu Shaoqi. * *** Her recommendations were in opposition to those proposed by Hua 
Guofeng, who in a year's time was to succeed Mao. In an ironic sequel to this conference, 
a "Second National Conference on Learning from Dazai in Agriculture” was held in 
December of 1976. It was addressed by Hua Guofeng and he urged a policy of 
moderation toward the then recently arrested Gang of Four. His comments indicated the 
dilemma facing the party; "Take JQ for example, after all, she was Chairman Mao's wife. 
No matter what outrageous crimes she committed, if we deal with her in the extreme, it 
would have implications for Chairman Mao, which would be harmful to the cause of the 
Party."**® The problem facing Mao's successors would be to find a way to condemn 
Mao's wife, and yet spare Mao.
After Lin Biao's death, the dominant Communist leader besides Mao was Zhou 
Enlai. Several instances of friction between JQ and Zhou have been recorded here. This 
friction, initiated by JQ, was part of her plan to achieve sole leadership of the communist 
party. While her activities in 1975 were curtailed, she continued feuding with both Zhou 
and Deng Xiaoping. Hua Guofeng who did not have the political support structure that 
Deng (thanks to Liu) had, was apparently not important enough for her to combat.
But the publicity effort was not forgotten. "She continued to orchestrate a 
campaign to set herself up as Mao's successor," using publicity provided by control of 
news media. * *® In a quotation provided by Witke, although occurring four years after her 
interviews, but before Mao's death, JQ claimed that "The man must abdicate and let the 
woman take over. . . .  Even under Communism, there can still be an empress." This
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publicity campaign was successful to the extent that "JQ's reputation soared in the 611 of 
1974, and into the next spring, and so did those of empresses." And, in a desperate 
attempt to lay claim to Mao's position, JQ was alleged to have forged and altered 
documents to prove that Mao had named her as his successor. ̂  There was evidence to 
support this claim, which became one o f the issues at her trial as a member, indeed leader, 
of the Gang of Four.
Throughout the CR, JQ's attacks on individual, successful women were 
particularly noteworthy. She insured the public trial and humiliation of Fan Jin, who had 
become editor of the Beijing Daily News, and who many years before had replaced her in 
Yu Qiwei's favor. Xu Guangping, wife of Lu Xun, "the twentieth century's greatest 
protest writer and a man whom she idolized," was persecuted and eventually died. Why? 
"It was an aftereffect of the literary struggle between Zhou Yang and Lu Xun during the 
middle 1930s," she glibly explained. Sun Weishi, "a very bright and innovative woman 
theatrical director, and an adopted daughter of Zhou Enlai, was imprisoned and tortured 
to death in 1968, in Qin Cheng Number One, a secret prison in a suburb of Beijing. 
Butterfield suggested that Sun's imprisonment was simply professional jealousy on the part 
of JQ, but it may also have been motivated by JQ's continuing enmity with Zhou. Even 
Zhou's high-ranking position was not enough to save his daughter fi'om this fate.
Other women of ability and reputation fared no better. Ding Ling had supervised 
political education, edited records o f the Long March, and taught literature while in 
Yanan. While there, she was known as "a trailbreaker in every field, particularly in the 
emancipation of women." She had ridiculed the CCP leadership over hypocrisy 
regarding their talk about equality for women and their actual treatment of women, and 
antagonized JQ over the issue of her marriage to Mao. She had been imprisoned by the 
GMD and again by the Communist government during the anti-rightist movement after the 
Hundred Flowers campaign. JQ showed her no sympathy, and she was imprisoned yet
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again, for five years, in April of 1970. One other female cadre and CCP member, Zhang 
Zhixin, who spoke out against the Gang of Four and became a cult hero, claimed that JQ 
was a destroyer of China's culture and literature. Zhang was arrested, tortured, and 
executed by having her throat slit, in April of 1975.
Much of JQ's venom was reserved for Wang Guangmei, wife of Mao's political 
rival Liu Shaoqi, and toward whom she was engaged in a personal "vendetta. As 
wife of China's Chief of State, she was for many years China's "First Lady" and was also 
politically active. She was "struggled against" and publicly humiliated on several 
occasions. Three years earlier, she had asked JQ's opinion about the propriety of wearing 
a necklace on a state visit to Indonesia. Against JQ's advice, she wore the necklace. 
Antagonism between JQ and Wang Guangmei ran deep; JQ regarded Wang as a poor 
representative of communism, and Wang may have been jealous of JQ's rising status. 
Numerous other wives o f renounced communist leaders, as well as their families, became 
JQ's victims. JQ "insisted that every time an ofiScial was purged, his wife also be
fe U e d ." l2 6
Women did not form a significant portion of political leaders in China, or in any of 
the important sectors of Chinese life. Perhaps inhibited by the culture of the Confucian 
ethic, or just simple prejudice, a woman leader in any field was a rare occurrence. Fox 
Butterfield reported (in 1982) "a great leap forward of human dignity that Chinese women 
have made since 1949." But although one-third of China's scientists and engineers were 
female, 80% of farm field work was done by women, and old assumptions about male 
superiority and feminine inferiority remained. Butterfield concluded that "the CR had no 
immediate effect of the status of women." Terrill concurred with the unimportance of 
JQ's achievements in support of feminism: "Playing the sex-and-power game meant, 
indeed, turning one's back on women's solidarity...  . The game JQ was playing could
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only be played on her own behalf, not for the cause of women in general." Peggie
Thom Vannozzi concluded that the feminism of the revolutionary operas merely 
"reaflBrmed traditional sex roles. Given JQ's opportunities, she could have 
acomplished much more in the advancement of feminist causes.
Zhou Enlai's death in January, 1976, presented an opportunity for JQ "After the 
Premier’s heart attack, JQ assumed an ever increasing role,. . .  because she had automatic 
access to the Chairman's bedroom and study." Mao himself had been in ill health for 
several years, and was virtually incapacitated at this time, and it is not clear how much 
governmental business was conducted between Zhou's death in January and Mao's death in 
September. But, "'inside people' claimed that it was JQ who personally prevented him 
[Mao] from attending any of the sad celebrations that marked the Premier's lying in 
state. At Zhou's funeral, JQ angered many Chinese by refusing to remove her hat, a 
sign of disrespect, and her popularity was in decline. In April of that year, public support 
of the memory of Zhou led to a spontaneous Tiananmen Square demonstration. When the 
government removed wreaths brought to honor Zhou, thousands of Chinese protested 
repression and injustice. Kamow claimed that the crowds were disbursed at JQ's 
command, although she was later to deny this.
The personal relation between Mao and Madame Mao, about which it would be 
difficult to obtain reliable information, has not been carefully documented. Butterfield 
reported an unnamed member of Mao's family as saying that JQ and Mao stopped living 
together as husband and wife as eariy as 1949, and that "Mao couldn't stand her. All her 
n a g ^ g  and ambitions. This was not a topic about which JQ confided any details to 
Witke, while Terrill stated simply, "In the 1960s, the marriage rev iv e d ."T o w ard  the 
end of his life, Mao and JQ entered yet another phase of their relationship. As a sign of 
trust between the two, she "was the only person who could use the Chairman's chop 
(seal), which is more important than a signature in China," and "The relations between
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Mao and his wife were, in fact, the unspoken but major problem of all those Chinese 
ministers responsible for both foreign and domestic policy roughly from the end of the 
Tenth Party Conference in August 1973 until Premier Zhou's [Enlai] death early in January 
1976."^ '̂  ̂ It is not the intent of this thesis to document the personal relationship between 
Mao and Madame Mao. It should be noted, however, that this relationship and the 
perception of it by high CCP officials had an effect on events and policies of the CR.
Hidden behind the public image o f the actress Lan Ping was the real person, JQ. 
Before the CR, she could use her influence to make demands and give orders to directors, 
producers, or arts' personnel. These demands and orders may or may not have been 
followed, but with her increased political power, she could and did enforce her wishes by 
having dissenters arrested or otherwise harassed. Terrill observed correctly that "Had she 
not been Mao's wife, JQ would have been a perfect target of the CR."^^^ This could be 
true, given her lifestyle and previous way of life in Shanghai. But had she not been 
Mao's wife, she would not have been in a position to act as she did. Equally important, 
the CR would not have been the same without her influence. Her personality alone would 
have made her many enemies, but whether they would have persecuted her to the extent 
she persecuted them is doubtful. Madame Mao became, in the words of Edward Rice, 
the CR's "grand inquisitor. The grand inquisitor was herself soon to be inquisitioned.
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CHAPTERS
GRAND FINALE 
The Curtain Falls
According to traditional Chinese beUef natural disasters are omens of political 
change. An earthquake centered near the northern China city of Tangshan, "the worst 
disaster of its kind in the history of mankind," preceded by six weeks the death of Mao 
Zedong. ̂  One month later, on October 8, "every radio broadcast the electrifying news: 
"The Central Committee, under the leadership of First Party Vice-Chairman Hua Guofeng, 
has completely smashed the counter-revolutionary group, the Gang of Four! I ! !'." The 
"Gang" included Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, and JQ.^
Sreemati Chakrabarti, based on radio reports from the Himan Provincial Service, 
wrote that three types of charges were initially made against the gang. He categorized 
these as vague, minor, and concrete.^ Examples of vague charges were such things as 
"sabotaging Chairman Mao's instructions," "hampering the economy of Hunan," and 
"discouraging agricultural mechanization in Hunan province." Minor offenses included 
"purposely delaying by 53 minutes the plane carrying representatives from Hunan to 
Beijing to mourn Mao" and "the drinking of wine during the mourning period." The 
concrete charges were equally innocuous: "They attacked the opera 'Gardener's Song' and 
criticized and censored the movie 'Pioneers'" and "forced Zo Dabring [who had played a 
leading female role in local Hunan opera] to conduct self-criticism." 'Gardener’s Song' had 
been staged successfully in 1972, was later filmed, and withdrawn because JQ thought it
73
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"negated the CR." All o f the concrete "crimes" included in this list are o f this relatively 
minor nature, and all involved genuinely cultural, not political, activities. As Hunan was 
mentioned prominently in these broadcasts from Hunan, similar sets of complaints 
appropriate for other provinces were no doubt issued .
For all the horrors and excesses of the CR, these charges seem innocent enough. 
However, within the Chinese conception of justice there is a distinction between // and fa. 
Professor Benjamin Schwartz explained that // has been translated as "propriety," while fa  
has been translated as "laws."'^ Observing^ meant adhering to written, codified statutes, 
while observing li involved doing what one was expected to do, given one's position in 
life. JQ and the Gang of Four had committed "crimes" in the sense that they had acted in 
ways high governmental officials were not supposed to act. They were accused of 
violating //, not fa, but the accusations were no less serious because of that. The Chinese 
government would take four years to prepare criminal charges.
Not long after the arrest of the Gang of Four, Time magazine published a cover 
story on Jiang Qing (March 21, 1977), keyed to the publication ofWitke's biography, and 
which contained long excerpts from that book. Time announced that she was one of the 
world's most powerful women (but did not suggest any other women who were as 
powerful). The article reflected certain American misconceptions of JQ. One 
misconception was the common one, that her importance was confined to cultural matters. 
A second was that her criminal activities occurred late in the CR, after the rise of the Gang 
of Four, and were related to attempts to "seize power." This misconception conveniently 
separated JQ from any earlier wrong-doing by Mao. Adding to her mystique. Time 
described JQ as "A woman of great complexity,. . .  very intelligent, capable of great 
charm. She is also arrogant, unpredictable, self-centered. She is tireless, nervous, 
excitable."^ But Time exaggerated the charges when it had reported eaiiier that during 
Mao's last illness, "she tried to murder him."^ Nothing of this serious nature was
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mentioned at her trials, nor by Mao's physician, Li. Newsweek acknowledged her 
aspirations to succeed Mao, and reported that she circulated a poem by Mao that urged 
her "to reach the top," and to complete the revolution he had begun.^
The Gang of Four trials, which began in November, 1980, actually involved ten 
defendants. In addition to the "Gang," they included Chen Boda and five generals 
associated with Lin Biao, who had been arrested at the time o f his death in 1971.^ In an 
ironic turn of events, JQ was linked in these trials with Lin. One part of the report of the 
trial was entitled "Records of the Trial by the People's Supreme Court Against Major 
Defendants of the Anti-Revolutionary Clique of Lin Biao and JQ Yet JQ's alliance with 
Lin had been brief, and she was feuding with him long before the exposure of his plots 
against Mao's life. JQ was apparently linked with Lin, whose criminality was not 
questioned by the Chinese, to reinforce, by association, the idea of her own guilt.
At their trial, the four were accused of committing national betrayal, hampering 
foreign trade, ruining the educational system, threatening civil war, counter-revolutionary 
activity, framing innocent people, being ambitious, trying to capture supreme power, and 
insulting people, among other charges. The actual indictment against the defendants, 
"Indictment of the Special Procuratorate," spelled out in some detail forty-eight more or 
less specific crimes. ̂  ̂  Lin Biao and Kang Sheng, although necessarily not present at the 
trial, were prominently mentioned in the charges. Item three was typical: "Jiang Qing and 
Kang Sheng cooked up false charges to persecute Members o f the Eight CCP Central 
Committee." Also, at one time, JQ had sent emissaries to Mao to persuade him not to 
make Deng Xiaoping a Vice Premier, hence, another violation of li, not fa.
JQ was tried last. Terrill suggested that by placing her trial tenth, the all-male 
court attempted to further denigrate her.*^ But her placement in tenth position can also 
be interpreted as an admission of her importance. At her trial, JQ pleaded that she was 
Mao's dog, biting whom he said to bite.^^ She cursed her enemies, and insulted the court
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and prosecutors. "In the face o f irrefutable evidence that she collaborated with Kang 
Sheng to concoct cases against the revolutionary cadres of the Eighth Central Committee, 
JQ had the impudence to hurl insults at witnesses and disrupt the order of the court." 
When questioned about the events of April, 1976, in Tiananmen Square, when the 
government suppressed supporters of Zhou Enlai, JQ responded, "Don't ask me, ask the 
man who was Minister of Public Security at the time [i.e., none other than Hua 
Guofeng] . "Her  defiance at least illustrated her courage, and even won the admiration 
of some, as it was clear that she would not kowtow to the judges who literally held her life 
in their hands.
Beginning in October of 1967, and continuing for three years, Kang Sheng had 
supervised 700 military clerks in a search for references to activities in Shanghai of JQ, 
Zhang Chunqiao, and himself, dating from the 1930s. The point of this was to eliminate
any evidence that could be used against these three during and after the CR, and JQ "lived 
in constant fear of possible revelations about her past." It is a testimony to Kang's 
thoroughness, perhaps, that he was successful in such an imposing project, for nothing of 
this period of JQ's life was mentioned at her trial. Kang became ill of cancer in 1970, and 
died in 1975. Terrill reported that Kang kept some files on JQ which showed that she had 
indeed been a GMD collaborator in the 1930s. On the basis of evidence disclosed at the 
Gang of Four trials, Kang was implicated in many acts of cruelty, and some people 
concluded that he was "The brains behind the Gang of Four." Throughout the CR,
Kang had been JQ's friend and ally, and much of her influence was due to his support.
Had he lived long enough, there may have been a Gang of Five.
Chinese tradition maintained that the accused at a trial first confess to the crime 
before sentence was passed. In spite of claiming to being a loyal Communist, JQ was too 
much of an individualist to accept this doctrine when applied to herself. Harvard Law 
Professor Jerome Cohen wrote that "intensive interrogations in an inquisitorial setting.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
77
long periods of detention between interrogations, constant repetition of the theme of 
leniency for those who confess, and application of other psychological techniques to break 
the suspect's resistance create an inherently coercive environment that elicits many 
confessions."^^ JQ did not succumb to this pressure, intimidation, imprisonment, and 
threat of execution, and remained unrepentant and defiant. Professor S. K. Ghosh cited 
"two cardinal sins" that JQ committed, apart from any crimes of which she was accused: 
"She challenged the authority of the court, which is seen as sacred, being the symbol of the 
nation, and she showed 'insincerity' by not making a confession. Eight of the 
defendants meekly admitted to various crimes; Zhang Chunqiao remained silent, refusing 
even to acknowledge the legitimacy of the court. Newsweek reported that at one time the 
trials had to be postponed because JQ continued to insist that she acted with Mao's 
consent and refused to confess.^^
Business Week reported that the general theme of the trials was that an ill and 
aging Mao was exploited by the Gang of Four. Ghosh echoed this idea: "it was the 
effective judgment o f the court that. . .  during the last few years of his life, Mao had no 
effective control over the 'Gang' led by JQ, who, in view of her closeness to the Chairman, 
took maximum advantage of the situation and dominated the Chinese political scene.
Butterfield described the trials as being "disguised as a Beijing opera, complete 
with rehearsals," and they reminded others of organized struggle sessions.^^ Newsweek 
confirmed this theatrical aspect of the proceedings; "one pre-trial hearing was filmed three 
times before officials were happy with JQ's performance." Although some aspects of 
the trials were televised, many of the proceedings were held in secrecy. Public television 
versions of the trials had been heavily edited.^^
Reminding the court that she had accompanied Mao to the battle front in WWn,
JQ asked the judges where they had been hiding at the time. She was removed from the
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courtroom on more than one occasion, shouting the CR slogans "To rebel is justified," and 
"Revolution is no crime. In a final act of defiance and in a belief that she would be 
killed, JQ challenged the court to execute her in public, in Tiananmen Square. She was 
actually sentenced to death, but given two years time in which to "reform." At the end of 
the two years, the sentence was changed to life imprisonment.
There were few women with whom JQ had close fiiendships, and instances of her 
vindictive attitude towards specific women has been documented here. She did not 
contribute significantly to feminist causes in general, and her attitude toward males is 
illustrated by the comment that "Man's contribution to human history is nothing more than 
a drop of sperm. Having thus alienated herself from both sexes, JQ had few persons to
defend her. Li added credence to the belief that she was generally disliked, or feared, even 
by those close to her, when he quoted Wang Dongxing, head of security for Mao for many 
years, who said that he "would go to the end of the earth to get rid of JQ."^®
The trials were a cause of general happiness among the Chinese people; "at last 
we had someone to blame for our miseries."^^ Some shops exhausted their supplies of 
alcoholic beverages, as people celebrated. Meals consisting of four crabs — three male 
and one female — became very popular, as a crab, with its sideways, broad manner of 
walking, was a symbol of someone wanting to "hog the whole road." The Gang of Four 
members became objects of social ridicule. A comedy sketch "Maozi Gungchang" ("The 
Hat Factory," 1977, by Chang Guitian and Chang Baohua) satirized them for putting 
"hats" — that is, labels, or unfair accusations — on people. "Whiteboned Demon 
Unmasked" was a lengthy comedy routine (by Ma Ji and Tang Jiezhong) directed at JQ 
herself. JQ was viciously satirized in this comedy act, in which an autopsy" was 
performed on her body, and a second face found on the back of her head, symbolizing the 
public perception of her hypocrisy in urging them to live a life of austerity and sacrifice.
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while she herself led quite another lifestyle. When her stomach was opened, worms 
tumbled out, which the comedians (humorously) stomped on, all over the stage.^^
The Gang of Four became symbols "upon whom the Chinese people could vent 
their anger," but for many Chinese intellectuals, "the Gang of Four remained a flimsy 
answer to a problem that required deeper explanation. It was ridiculous to think that four 
people somehow did it all." '̂* Indeed, four people did not do it all, but in a movement of 
such complexity, involving so many, the separation of the guilty from the innocent was an 
impossible task.
In a "Resolution on Certain Questions in the HSstory of our Party Since The 
Founding of the People's Republic of China," adopted June 27,1981, at the Sixth Plenary 
Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP, the ideas and practices of the CR 
and the Ninth Congress were renounced.^^ This document placed responsibility for the 
CR on Mao, and accused Mao of committing errors in not adhering to "Mao Zedong 
Thought." The thought' of the man was to be revered, if not the man himself.
Critical Reviews
China is too vast and complex a stage for any one person to direct the entire scope 
of events that occur therein, but it has been the thesis of this paper that JQ had a major 
influence on the events of the CR. She was a unique person in a unique position at a 
critical time in China's history, and was a suitable vehicle to carry out the ideas of this 
revolution. The CR was the product of Mao's plan and JQ's personality. She determined 
its emphasis and much of the extent to which it was violent. Without her presence, the CR 
would have been a far different event in China's history. Terrill, recognizing something of 
her importance, suggested that "without JQ there may not have been a CR, and certainly
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Mao would not have called it a cultural revolution."^^ Various writers have ascribed to 
JQ a responsibility here or there, or on this point or that point, but no single source has 
attributed the importance to JQ that I have assigned to her here. Chinese authorities were 
not misled about her relevance. For all the horrors of the CR, she was one of only two 
persons (the other being Zhang Chunqiao) who was sentenced to death. The significance 
of this was lost on Western writers.
Early Western historians o f the CR gave little attention to Madame Mao. In The 
Cultural Revolution in China (Berkeley, 1971), Thomas Robinson, ed., Jiang Qing was 
mentioned only once, and then in a footnote. A major study by Roderick MacFarquhar, 
The Origins of the Cultural Revolution (New York, 1974), gave her little more notice and 
no more significance. In China in Ferment, by Richard Baum (Englewood Cliflfe, 1971), 
JQ was listed only in a chronology of events, in connection with a Red Guard speech. 
Franklin Houn noted that the article criticizing "Hai Rui's Dismissal" had been "written 
under the direct guidance of Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing," and acknowledged that she "was 
shortly to play a leading role in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," but he did not 
develop the theme of her contributions in this role.^^
Maurice Meisneris Mao's China and After (London, 1986), an updated version of 
his original work Mao's China (New York, 1977), is a major source of information on the 
CR. In the 1986 version, Meisner acknowledged that earlier he had known little about the 
Gang of Four.^* A new chapter on the "concept of cultural revolution" was added, but 
even the new version shows little appreciation o f the revolution's cultural significance, and 
JQ's role is merely one of making radical speeches.
Later writers of the 1980s, of whom Rodzinski is typical, began to acknowledge 
JQ's presence, but only in the context of a group; "the clique of JQ" or "the faction to 
which JQ belonged" are ways in which she was referred to then. Craig Dietrich's People's 
China (New York, 1986) is a readable account of the period, but Dietrich likewise viewed
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her as one of the radical faction, allied with Chen Boda. This phraseology tacitly 
recognized her importance, by making her the group leader. John K. Fairbank, in his 
popular text East Asia, (Revised Edition, Boston, 1989), mentioned JQ only in passing. In 
the excellent book The Search for Modem China (New York, 1990), Jonathan Spence 
gave few details on JQ, although his biographical sketch referred to her as "a major 
political figure of the CR."^^ In 1989, Nfichael Schoenhals, a researcher for the Swedish 
Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences, reviewed over a dozen official 
and unofficial histories and collections of articles on the CR."*® Yet in his reviews of these 
works, Schoenhals referred to JQ twice, and then only in relation to Lin Biao. Schoenhals 
did make numerous references to the Gang of Four, a partial admission of her importance, 
but only within that group.
New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution (1991), a collection of scholarly 
articles edited by William Joseph, Christine Wong, and David Zweig, gave scant notice to 
JQ. She was mentioned (of necessity) in Richard Kraus' article "Art Policies o f the 
Cultural Revolution," but Kraus' subtitle, "The Rise and Fall of Cultural Minister Yu 
Huiyong," indicated his main interest. For all of these writers, and many more, the CR 
may very well have occurred without JQ's presence.
More surprising is the fact that her major American biographer, Roxane Witke, 
did not acknowledge her political significance. Part V of her book, summarizing JQ's 
achievements, was entitled "Mistress of the Arts.'"^  ̂ Witke viewed JQ as aspiring to 
"supreme cultural control," but she had not carefully examined JQ's role in the CR.^^ For 
her, JQ's political life was as "one of the Gang of Four." Terrill's more extensive 
biography of JQ still regarded her primarily as "Mao's wife," and traced her CR activity as 
a series of vindictive acts against past enemies. IBs chapter on her life in the 1960s is 
entitled simply "Recovery [i.e. fi’om illnesses of the 1950s] and R e v e n g e . B u t  while
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Terrill acknowledged something of her importance, he did not attribute to her any political 
prominence.
The Bibliographical Essays section of Volume 15 (1991) of the authoritative 
Cambridge History of China recorded this observation; "Interestingly, there have been 
few fUl-length scholarly studies devoted to the CR."^ This comment remains true today. 
A reason for this may be that the events are still too recent to allow for the historical 
perspective required for scholarly analysis. It was foreign journalists and diplomats, 
looking from the outside in, that provided much of the record of that period. The 
Cambridge IBstory continued with another interesting observation; "little has been written 
that focuses specifically on Mao's role in the m o v e m e n t . T h e  lack of studies on Mao 
indicates that perhaps his role was not central in understanding much that happened during 
theCR.
A major reason writers overlooked JQ's influence during the CR was of course 
that she was difficult to distinguish within the immense shadow of Mao. Her dependence 
on Mao extended beyond relying on his political authority. "While Mao was alive, JQ had 
been accorded the greatest respect. When she walked into a meeting, everyone would 
stand and the room would fall silent." After Mao's death, "No one paid any attention 
when she came into the room ..  . the atmosphere within the Politburo had been 
transformed.'"^ Beyond the obvious conclusion that JQ was dependent for her political 
power on the fact that she had been Mao's wife, there is the additional point here that after 
Mao was gone, Chinese officials no longer felt that they even had to be polite to her.
Another reason JQ has been overlooked may be due to preconceptions about 
women's abilities to contribute. Mark Selden's otherwise fine book on the Yanan years, 
for instance, can be read without ever learning that JQ (or Ding Ling) were present 
there.Further ,  JQ was neither wise nor benevolent, and persons who believe that 
countries are governed by wise and benevolent rulers, acting in the best interests of the
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citizenry that they govern, will be disappointed in the view expressed here that JQ was a 
nuyor Actor in determining the course of China's history during the CR. Because she 
lacked a significant, positive political theory of her own, it does not follow that she was 
not influential.
JQ was tried in a Chinese court, and little that is new by the way of judgment will 
be presented here. Her interviews with Witke are almost entirely accounts of herself and 
her feuds and disputes with other people, and it was charged against JQ that these 
interviews were not conduct befitting a Communist leader. But Mao had not been 
censured for several interviews with the American journalist Edgar Snow, and JQ had no 
doubt been motivated by Mao’s earlier interviews in seeking her own biographer.
Throughout her life, JQ's relationships with so many people were antagonistic. 
Motivated by vindictiveness and jealousy, she sought to redress wrongs she imagined to 
have suffered as long ago as forty years earlier. Anyone who disagreed with JQ, or 
opposed her in any way, became an enemy and an object of revenge. But she fell out of 
favor with the Chinese people, and her fall confirmed the Chinese saying that for a leader 
to lose the peoples' hearts is to lose the world. Deng Xiaping, shortly before her trial, 
remarked that "She is a very, very, evil woman. She is so evil that any evil thing you say 
about her isn't evil enough.
Who can predict the further excesses the people of China would have had to 
endure, had JQ succeeded in her aspiration of becoming head of the Communist Party, 
virtually a position of Empress? Whatever form her rule would have taken, it would have 
sooner or later self-destructed: the constant themes of revolution and the rejection of 
authority would have led to its own ruin. JQ as empress? Surely she would at least have 
taken a new name! We cannot believe that this would have been a productive time for 
China. The theme of continuing revolution soon becomes revolution for its own sake, 
with no other purpose, as happened with much of the fighting between factions of RGs.
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JQ's political theories were merely repetitions of Maoism, and those were dated views that 
belonged to a China which had not been enlightened by exposure to the effects of those 
views when put into the hands of political extremists.
A cynical interpretation of the CR would view it as the scenario of a power 
struggle among Chinese leaders. Yao Ming-le described the CR as a three-way power 
struggle between JQ, Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai.'*  ̂ That JQ and Lin Biao desired the most 
powerful position as head of the CCP is now clear. It is not clear that Zhou wanted this 
power for himself and his position throughout the CR was one of moderation, and a 
genuine desire for the welfare of the Chinese, rather than a blind adherence to a political 
doctrine. And Terrill adopted this cynical view when he wrote of the CR that there was 
"nothing rational beneath the vanity, frustration and thirst for revenge that triggered it."̂ ®
But an idealist interpretation would view the CR as an attempt to convert the 
thinking of the masses to the "pure" thought of true communism, as propounded by 
Chairman Mao. This view would make the CR analogous to a religious movement, and 
indeed the similarities are numerous: the single-minded fervor of the true believer, the 
mind numbing repetition of litany-like slogans, the appeal to the emotions of the crowds to 
sweep away unrighteousness, the near deification of Mao, and yes, even the extreme 
cruelty shown to those unwilling to accept the new doctrine, which was to "touch people's 
souls." "Confess and repent" are slogans of evangelists, and are words that have firm 
religious connotations. Similar ideas of the CR were to "cleanse human nature o f egotism" 
via a "perpetual process of purification."^^ JQ and her followers, who had no strong 
religious backgrounds or beliefs, sought to destroy and change human nature, and to 
coerce human activity into other-directed behavior in accordance with their preconceived 
theories. They unknowingly resorted to well-known religious techniques of the Western 
world as a practical means of achieving those objectives.
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Tang Tsou, among others, has noted that "one of the most extraordinary and 
puzzling events of the 20th century is surely the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 
China. It has been a secondary objective of this thesis to partially disagree with this 
assessment, and to show that while the events of the CR were certainly not predictable, 
they were, by occurring within the political situation of China as they did, to some extent 
understandable.
JQ was sentenced to death in January 1981, subject to a two-year period in which 
she could show signs of rehabilitation. Adding to her humiliation in a petty way, the 
People's Daily referred to her as a "third-rate actress."^^ She was imprisoned in Qin 
Cheng Number One, and her sentence was changed to life imprisonment in January of 
1983. Various medical problems, including her throat cancer, began recurring, and she 
was allowed to be under house arrest in May, 1984.
Time magazine reported her death by suicide in June, 1991. She was 
acknowledged in a follow-up article to have "wielded vast and malevolent power in the 
last decade of Mao's life."̂ ** Witke wrote that after her death, the Chinese government 
prohibited the distribution o f books, articles and photographs about her, and forbade radio 
and television broadcasts o f the model operas.^^ Witke clung to the kindlier portrayal of 
JQ from her 1972 interviews, and attributed more vicious portraits to a "cunning 
distortion" of those interviews. Although she attributed paranoia and hyprochrondria to 
JQ, Witke still respected her enough to speculate that Mao, declining in health during the 
1970s, may have needed JQ's support of his image to remain in his top position. JQ was, 
during the time of the CR, "the most powerful woman in the world.
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1. Onate, 540. The cause of Mao's death, on September 9, 1976, was widely 
reported as Paridnson's disease. His physician, Li Zhisui, however, said that it was due to 
a rare motor neuron disorder, popularly known as Lou Gehrig's disease (p. 9).
2. Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, Son of the Revolution (New York, 1983), 
264. Wang Hongwen, a vice chairman of the CCP from 1969 to 1976, has not been 
discussed here. HoUingworth (p. 273) stated that he had become the third man in the 
Party, but that "he did little but run around for Jiang Qing."
3. Sreemati Chakrabarti, "Campaign Against the 'Gang of Fouf in Hunan: The 
Early Phase," China Report, XVI, #3 (May-June, 1980), 27-33.
4. Benjamin Schwartz, "On Attitudes toward Law in China," Jerome Alan 
Cohen. The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China. 1949-1963 (Cambridge. 
Mass., 1968), 62-70, citing Milton Katz, Government Under Law and the Individual 
(Washington, D C , 1957), 27-39.
5. Time, June 21, 1977, p. 42+.
6. Ibid., November 29, 1976, p. 32
7. Newsweek. October 25, 1976, p. 51 and November 8, 1976, p. 40.
8. Dietrich, 267-68.
9. Myers, vol. 2, 361.
10. Onate, 540.
11. Myers, vol. 4., 110-142.
12. Terrill, Madame, 14.
13. Ibid., 412. Terrill gave a good account of her conduct at the trial, p. 379-92.
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14. Myers, vol. 2, 373, citing People’s Daily (undated).
15. Ghosh, 7.
16. Byron, 336-37.
17. Bamouin, 209.
18. Terrill, Madame, 356. Kang confided this information to Wang Hairong and 
Nancy Tang, two close associates of Mao, during his final illness. These two decided not 
to report the matter to Mao.
19. Byron, 416,418. Kang was posthumously expelled fi"om the CCP in 1980.
20. Cohen, 49. A revised criminal code in 1979 prohibited forced confessions.
21. Ghosh, 6.
22. Newsweek, November 17, 1980, p. 63.
23. Business Week, November 24, 1980, p. 63. Business Week also noted that
Mao's pictures were being removed firom public places, and that there were fewer 
references to his economic and political theories, in anticipation of the eventual "re- 
interpretation" of Mao.
24. Ghosh, 7.
25. Butterfield, 357.
26. Newsweek, December 8, 1980, p. 59.
27. Time, December 15, 1980, p. 45.
28. Ibid., January 5, 1981, p. 69, and January 12, 1981, p. 27.
29. Terrill, Madame, 302, citing Issues and Studies, September, 1977, p. 104.
30. Li, 621.
31. Liang, 264.
32. Perry Link, "The Genie and the Lamp: Revolutionary 
McDougall, 85, citing Art Tune tapes, Hong Kong, no. BA-138, and 107.
33. Jay and Linda Mathews, One Billion: A China Chronicle (New York, 1983),
309.
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35. Myers, vol. 4, 43-94.
36. Terrill, Madame, 298.
37. Houn, 295.
38. Meisner, Mao's China and After, xi.
39. Spence, 797.
40. Michael Schoenhals, "Unofficial and Official Histories o f the Cultural 
Revolution - a Review Article," The Journal of Asian Studies, 48 (August, 1989), 563-72.
41. Witke, Comrade, 378-478.
42. Ibid., 375.
43. Terrill, Madame, 237-301.
44. Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, eds., "Bibliographical Essays," in The 
Cambridge History of China, vol. 15 (Cambridge, 1991X 895.
45. Ibid., 896.
46. Li, 629.
47. Mark Selden, China in Revolution: the Yanan Way Revisited (Armonk, N.Y., 
1995). Originally published in 1970.
48. New York Times, August 31, 1980, p. 1.
49. Yao, 193.
50. Terrill, Madame, 298.
51. Kamow, 222.
52. Tang, 67.
53. Myers, vol. 2, 373, citing People's Daily, (no date).
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